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 “I think dust is probably one of our greatest inhibitors to a nominal operation on the 
Moon. I think we can overcome other physiological or physical or mechanical problems 
except dust.” 
       
 Gene Cernan 
 Apollo 17 Technical Debrief 
 
"A common sense, layered, engineering design defense can solve any apparent problem 
with dust during long-term human activity and habitation in the lunar environment." 
   
 Jack Schmitt 
 Ames Research Center  
 Lunar Dust Symposium 
February 2, 2004 
 
 
As NASA embarks on its Exploration Vision, it will encounter many technical challenges. For lunar 
exploration missions, perhaps its greatest challenge will be to learn to live with lunar dust. NASA will 
have to be prepared to meet that challenge. Lunar dust can be managed by using good engineering design 
for reliability and ease of maintenance and by incorporating innovative technologies and operations into 
Lunar mission design. 
 
Problems associated with lunar dust during the Apollo Program were reviewed and are detailed in this 
report. The Apollo Mission Reports and Technical Debriefs were used to identify problems, solutions, 
and lessons learned. These documents were chosen because they were prepared immediately after the 
missions, while crewmembers memories of their lunar experience were still fresh. This report 
intentionally did not include later documentation and statements by crews, because memories fade and 
change, this methodology should produce a historically factual report. This report should be considered a 
starting point.  
 
However, recollection at a distance from an event doesn’t necessarily degrade the quality of the 
information, but, tends to cull less memorable events and reinforce the very memorable ones. This can be 
useful as well. Review and analysis of additional documents should also be performed to supplement the 
information contained in this report to ensure all available information is considered. Supplementary 
reports should be published periodically as additional information is evaluated. 
 
The report evaluates information presented in the Apollo documents and proposes forward work 
to manage lunar dust in Constellation’s lunar missions. Recommendations center on solutions to 




This report is divided into eleven sections. 
  
1. Surface Obscuration During Descent 
2. LM Descent Engine Regolith Transport 
3. Lunar Module Contamination 
4. Contamination during Transfer between the LM and CSM 
5. Command Module Contamination 
6. Mechanisms for Lunar Module Contamination 
a. General Effects 
b. Traction 
c. Cables and Cords 
d. Translation Aids 
e. Lunar Rover Vehicle 
f. Pockets 
7. External Environmental Lunar Dust Effects: 
a. Experiments 
b. Cameras 
c. Translation Aids 
d. Radio isotopic Thermal Generator 
e. Lunar Rover Vehicle 
f. Lunar Materials Sampling and Samples 
8. Space Suits and Seals 
9. Dust Characterization 
10. Human Effects 
11. Hygiene 
 
Each section is divided into the following subsections: 
 
 Summary provides a compilation of lunar dust problems encountered. 
 Observations contain relevant quotations, describing dust problems, from Apollo documents. 
 Recommendations and Lessons Learned contain quotations from Apollo documents. 
 Analysis is a combination of analysis presented in Apollo documents and analyses by the author. 
 Future work contains recommendations for on-going future work to manage lunar dust during 
Constellation’s lunar exploration missions. 
 
 
SURFACE OBSCURATION DURING DESCENT 
 
During Apollo landings, crews experienced regolith entrainment during the final maneuvers for 
landing. This obscured fine scale topography during the final touchdown and required landing the 




Surface obscuration during descent varied for each LM landing. For Apollo 11, visibility was 
degraded; During Apollo 12 and 15 the surface was completely obscured; For Apollo 14 and 17 
LM descents, the surface was readily visible; and Apollo 16 descent visibility was moderate.  
 
Contributing factors that may be considered in mission and engineering design include: 
 Landing site selection may be a factor in mission design, however, mission reports 
indicated that landing sites were similar, both in terms of characteristics and behavior of 
lunar dust.  
 Improved hovering procedures may have contributed to improved visibility due to 
reduced blowing dust.  
 Solar elevation angle may affect visibility. 




The Apollo 11 Mission report states, “Surface obscuration caused by blowing dust was apparent 
to 100 feet and became increasingly severely as the altitude decreased. Although visual 
determination of horizontal velocity, attitude, and altitude rate were degraded, cues for these 
variables were adequate for landing.” 1
 
The blowing dust caused by the Apollo 12 LM landing appears to have been worse than that of 
Apollo 11. In fact, a standup extravehicular activity (EVA) was performed by the crew to assess 
the site prior to performing lunar surface EVAs because blowing dust completely obscured the 
view during landing. 
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report described dust effects on landing visibility. “During the final phase 
of the lunar module descent, the interaction of the descent engine exhaust plume with the lunar 
surface resulted in the top layer of the lunar soil being eroded away. The particles were picked up 
by the gas stream and transported as a dust cloud for long distances at high speeds. Crew 
visibility of the surface and surface features was obscured by the dust cloud.” 2 
 
The report continues, “The first time that dust is detected from the photographic observations 
occurs 52 seconds before touchdown. This time corresponds to an altitude of about 100 feet. 
There is no commentary in the voice transcription relative to dust at this point, but postflight 
debriefings indicate the crew noticed the movement of dust particles on the surface from a 
relatively higher altitude. At 180 feet altitude the Lunar Module Pilot made the comments that 
they could expect to get some dust before long. However, the initial effect of the dust, as first 
observed in the film or by the crew, indicates that there was no degradation in the visibility prior 
to about 100 feet in altitude. However, the crew stated that dust was first observed at an altitude 
of about 175 feet. Dust continued to appear in the sequence camera photographs for the next 10 
or 12 seconds as the lunar module descended to about 60 to 70 feet in altitude. Visibility is seen 
to have degraded, but not markedly. Beyond this point, the film shows the dust becoming more 
 
dense. Although surface features are still visible through the dust, impairment of visibility is 
beginning. Degradation of visibility continues until the surface is completely obscured and 
conditions are blind. The point at which this total obscuration occurs is somewhat subjective. At 
25 seconds before touchdown, the dust cloud is quite dense, although observations of the film 
show some visibility of the surface. From the pilot’s point of view, however, visibility is seen to be 
essentially zero at this time, which corresponds to an altitude of about 40 feet…obscuration 
occurred at an altitude of about 50 feet is confirmed. The Commander considered visibility to be 
so completely obscured at this point that he depended entirely on his instruments for landing 
cues.”2
 
Pete Conrad described the blowing dust in the Apollo 12 Technical Debrief:  “I’ve already 
commented on the blowing dust. I felt it was very bad. It looked a lot worse to me than it did in 
the movies I saw of Neil’s landing. I’m going to have to wait and see our movies to determine if it 
doesn’t show up as badly in the movies as it does to the eye. Maybe we landed in an area that had 
more surface dust and we actually got more dust at landing. It seemed to me that we got the dust 
much higher than Neil indicated. It could be because we were in a hover, higher up coming 
down; I don’t know. But we had dust from – I think I called it around 300 feet.” 3
 
The Apollo 14 LM landing site apparently was less dusty than the previous two sites. However, 
Mitchell refers to landing procedures that may have reduced the blowing dust. 
 
Alan Shepard described lunar landing in the Apollo 14 Technical Debrief. “I believe that we had 
less problem with dust than they’ve had before. I think it’s because as we comment later on, the 
surface of the general area in which we landed was less dusty, that is, exclusive of the dust 
around the rim of craters. The general area appeared to have less dust and we certainly had no 
problem with dust at touchdown. I referred to the cross pointers during the final stages of the 
descent at less than 100 feet, but only to assure myself that I had done the best I could as far as 
cross velocity was concerned. The dust was obvious, but you could also see the rocks through the 
dust. We had no problems here.” 4
 
Mitchell continued, “Yes. That’s what we had practiced because of the dust problems. When we 
went into [rate- of-descent] ROD mode, we leveled out on ROD and kept it flying on over until I 
was sure we were to Triplet and into that area where we wanted to land, then we started on 
down. I might add that looking at the film of the descent last night the dust problem appears a lot 
worse on the film than it appeared to me on the window. I thought I could see a lot better…just 
looking out the window you can see the dust is no great problem at all.” 4
 
The Apollo 14 Mission report observed, “Blowing dust was first noted at an altitude of 110 feet, 
but this was not a detrimental factor. The dust appeared to be less than  6 inches in depth and 
rocks were readily visible through it…Touchdown occurred at shutdown with some small dust-
blowing action continuing during engine thrust tail-off or decay. As might be expected, these 
areas are generally coincident with those in which blowing surface dust was noted at low 
altitudes.” 5   
 
Scott, in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief said, “I went on down to 200 feet and started rounding 
out at 150 feet. I could see dust – just a slight bit of dust. At about 50 to 60 feet, the total view 
outside was obscured by dust. At about 50 to 60 feet, the total view outside was obscured by dust. 
I was completely [Instrument Flight Rules] IFR. I came into the cockpit and flew with the 
instruments from there on down.” 6
 
 
He continued, “But at the altitudes looking down as we approached the landing, it was very 
difficult to pick out the depressions. I did know that I was landing past the crater which I thought 
was the one north of Salyut, which I believe now was probably Last Crater. I could see that I was 
going to land to the west of that, but as far as the other shallow depressions there and the one in 
which the rear pad finally rested, I couldn’t see that they were really there. It looked like a 
relatively smooth surface.” 6
 
The Apollo 15 Mission report states, “A trace of blowing surface dust was observed at a height of 
130 feet with only a slight increase down to 60 feet. Beginning at this altitude, out-of-the window 
visibility was completely obscured by dust until after touchdown.” 7
 
In addition to obscured visibility, radar was affected by blowing dust. The Mission report states, 
“Landing radar outputs were affected at an altitude of about 30 feet by moving dust and debris.” 
7
 
During Apollo 16 LM descent, surface obscuration was moderate. John Young, the in the Apollo 
16 Technical Debrief said, “We did a hover for a short period of time there at about 40 feet off 
the ground, and the rates were practically zero and there was blowing dust.” 8
 
Duke suggested, “It started at about 80 feet, John.” 8
 
Young responded, “Yes, 80 feet. Certainly, it started there and it got a lot worse, but you could 
still see the rocks all the way to the ground. The surface features, even the craters and with 
something like that – which really surprised me. I was expecting two things: either the dust would 
be so bad we couldn’t see anything, or there probably wouldn’t be as much dust as there was. 
Possibly, it’s the 15-degree Sun angle that did all that. Because there’s certainly plenty of dust 
down there to blow, and there’s nothing thin about that regolith around the LM.” 8
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report stated, “Small traces of dust were evident at approximately 80 feet 
and the dust increased all the way to touchdown; however, the vehicle had lunar contact before 
the visibility obstruction due to dust prevented the Commander from seeing craters or small 
boulders on the surface.” 9
 
The Apollo 17 lunar landing generated a thin dust layer at a lower altitude than other landings. 
The Mission report states, “Dust was first observed at 60 to 70 feet altitude, as indicated on the 
tape meter.” 10
 
Cernan, in the Apollo 17 Technical Debrief says, “The dust layer was so very thin that I could 




The Apollo 12 Mission report compared blowing dust. 
 
“Compared to the Apollo 11 landing, the degradation in visibility as a result of dust erosion was 
much more severe during Apollo 12. During Apollo 11, the crew likened the dust to a ground fog; 
that is, it reduced the visibility, but never completely obscured surface features. On Apollo 12 the 
landing was essentially blind for approximately the last 40 feet. In order to better understand the 
reasons for these differences, a detailed analysis was initiated of the factors which affect erosion 
and visibility. The results of that analysis, although not completed, are summarized here. 
 
 
“First it was important to establish whether the surface material characteristics were different at 
the Apollo 11 and Apollo 12 landing sites. The various data sources provide no firm basis for a 
belief that a significant difference exists between the lunar material characteristics at the two 
sites. On the other hand, the following evidence indicates that the surface material behavior was 
essentially the same at the two sites. 
 
a. The height at which erosion first occurred was essentially the same on the two missions. The 
Apollo 11 sequence camera photographs indicate the first signs of dust at about 120 feet 
altitude about 65 seconds before landing. 
b. Photographs taken during the extravehicular activity in the general area of the lunar module 
revealed that the soil disturbances cause by the descent engine exhaust produced about the 
same effects on the two missions. 
c. Photographs of the crewmen’s boot prints indicate that the soil behaved about the same at 
the two sites. Although there were local variations in bootprint penetrations, such variations 
were observed at both sites. 
d. Analysis of the returned core tube samples indicates that the lunar soil had about the same 
density and the same particle size distribution at both sites. 
 
Since the soil characteristics were apparently the same at the two sites, the analysis was 
concentrated on the aspects of the two flights that were different, that is, the descent profile over 
the last 200 feet of altitude and the sun elevation level at landing. 
Results of these analyses indicate that both of the effects contributed to the poor visibility 
conditions on Apollo 12. The thrust level on Apollo 12 was somewhat higher over most of the 
final descent and was significantly higher (about 20 percent) at about 30 feet altitude at 15 to 20 
seconds before landing. This greater thrust caused a higher surface loading and therefore 
produced greater erosion rates. More significant, however was the effect of the lower sun angle. 
For given dust cloud density and combined effects of light attenuation, veiling luminance, and a 
diffuse illumination on the surface are much more serious at the lower sun level and can be 
shown analytically to produce the effects observed on Apollo 12. Analysis is continuing on a 
parametric variation of the factors which affect erosion and visibility. However, all these 
analyses are based upon certain assumptions about the optical scattering properties of the lunar 
dust and upon an idealized lunar model. Thus, these limitations make it impossible to 
conclusively prove that the effects noted can indeed be attributed to the sun elevation angle. 
Undeterminable differences in critical soil properties, such as cohesion, could have produced the 
same effects.”2
 
The report continues, “Preliminary studies show the impracticality of various means for reducing 
the dust effects on visibility, largely because of the weight and performance limitations of the 
spacecraft. The lunar module was designed with the capability to be flown entirely on instruments 
during the landing phase. The two accomplished lunar landings have provided the confidence 
that an instrument landing is within the capability of the spacecraft systems. Therefore, on Apollo 
13, onboard software will be modified to permit reentry into an automatic descent program after 
manual modes have been exercised. This change will allow selection or redesignation of a 
suitable landing site, followed by automatic nulling of horizontal rates and automatic vertical 
descent from the resulting hover condition, which would occur at an altitude above appreciable 
dust effects.” 2
 
Note that, after Apollo 12, the LM was modified to permit automatic descent. This change was 
the result of confidence in landing instruments. However, during the Apollo 15 landing, landing 




Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
Scott, in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief recommended, “I would recommend maintaining an 
altitude of at least 150 feet so you don’t get into dust problems. I think dust is going to be 




Additional documentation describing Apollo landing sites should be reviewed to definitively 
define dust variation, the effect of sun elevation on visibility, efficacy of hovering procedures, 
and radar operation. Based on review findings generate applicable Concept of Operations and 
requirements for Lunar Surface Mission Design, LSAM descent stage design, landing procedures 
and landing sites to mitigate dust risk during descent. 
 
 
LM DESCENT ENGINE REGOLITH TRANSPORT 
 
Blast ejecta from lunar descent and ascent may present problems for lunar missions when 
precursor missions include staging equipment and supplies prior to human landing. Damage to 
pre-positioned assets may threaten mission success. Blowing soil and debris may also damage the 
lunar lander and may present a risk to mission success. Some have suggested that descent engines 
may erode a crater underneath the lander, which could lead to slope failure and lander tip over. 
However, there was no indication that any significant erosion of a crater occurred beneath the 




Conrad, describing effects of the Apollo 12 LM landing, observed, “Now the one comment I 
made in flight was that there was a rock about 3 by 4 by 2 inches lying right under the engine 
ball. It hadn’t been blown away. I can’t figure out how it was lying right out at the skirt edge. We 
took a photograph of it. I don’t know whether it will show or not, but it didn’t get blown away. I 
was quite surprised after seeing all that dust and stuff flying on landing that it did not blow a rock 
that size away.”3
 
This would seem to suggest that cratering was not a problem. Understandably, Conrad was 
interested in this phenomenon because both crew members were cognizant of potential ejecta 
problems associated with their LM landing. A mission objective was to obtain a camera from the 
Surveyor III spacecraft in the vicinity of the landing site. Damage to the equipment would 
degrade mission success. 
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report describes mission planning to protect the Surveyor. “In addition, if 
the descent path were exactly nominal, the crew could apply manual site redesignation in ample 
time to land outside the Surveyor crater. Actually, as discussed in the previous section, the 
unperturbed (automatic) descent trajectory was very close to nominal (170 feet south and 380 
feet west of Surveyor), and the crew elected to over-fly the crater to the right side, eventually 
touching down very near its far rim. The final landing location, which was 535 feet from the 
Surveyor, was influenced by the preflight consideration that the landing occur outside a 500-foot 
radius of the target to minimize contamination of the Surveyor vehicle by descent engine exhaust 
and any attendant dust excitation.” 2
  
Bean described the condition of the Surveyor, “We noticed the Surveyor had turned to sort of a 
tan appearance, including the white parts, the chrome, and the shiny parts. We looked at it 
closely and rubbed it. You could rub off this brown color if you rubbed hard enough. It gave you 
the feeling that it wasn’t blown on when we flew down in the LM, or rather that it had adhered to 
it over the years it had been in the crater. We took enough pictures to document this.”3
 
The Mission report detailed Surveyor camera collection and related activities. “The Surveyor was 
sitting on a slope of approximately 12 degrees. All components were covered with a very 
tenacious dust, not unlike that found on an automobile that has been driven through several mud 
puddles and allowed to dry. While the dust was on all sides of the Surveyor, it was not uniform 
around each specific item. Generally, the dust was thickest on the areas that were most easily 
viewed when walking around the spacecraft. For example, the side of a tube or strut that faced 
the interior of the Surveyor was relatively clean when compared to a side facing outward. 
 
 
“Retrieving the television camera was not difficult using the cutting tool. The tubes appeared to 
sever in a more brittle manner that the new tubes of the same material used in preflight exercises. 
The electrical insulation had aged and appeared to have the texture of old asbestos. The mirrors 
on the surface of the electronic packages were generally in good condition. A few cracks were 
seen but no large pittings. The only mirrors that had become unbonded and separated were those 
on the flight control electronics package. As a bonus, the Surveyor scoop was removed. Although 
the steel tape was thin enough to bend in the shears and could not be cut, the end attached to the 
scoop became debonded when the tape was twisted with the cutter.”2
 
The report also provided a description of the Surveyor site. “Examination of the photographs 
taken at the Surveyor III site suggest that the lunar surface has undergone little change in the 
past 2 ½ years. The trenches excavated by the lunar material sampling device on Surveyor, as 
well as the waffle pattern of the Surveyor footpad imprint, appear much the same as when formed 
on Surveyor landing. Many of the Surveyor components were observed to be coated with a thin 
layer of dust, but some other process could also have discolored them. The results of a detailed 
postflight examination of the Surveyor components returned to earth will be published in a 
separate science report. The Surveyor components returned were a cable, a painted tube, an 
unpainted tube, the television camera, and the scoop.”2
 
The report described cratering at the landing site. “The area in the vicinity of the descent engine 
after touchdown appeared to have been cratered only to a depth of about 6 inches and, as 
photographs show, only in a small, well-defined area.”2
 
Bean describing lift-off said, “We got some good movies, I think. He fired some of the thrusters, 
and I took some 16-millimeter movies out the window. Hopefully, the geologist can get some feel 
for movement of dust with that engine and maybe compare or extrapolate down to the descent 
engine.”3
 
The Apollo 14 Mission report described no observable dust effects during LM ascent. “The lunar 
dust detector of the central station is showing normal outputs from all three photoelectric cells. 
No changes in the outputs of there cells were observed during or after lunar module ascent, 
indicating that dust from the ascent engine exhaust did not settle on the central station.”5
 
The Apollo 15 Mission report described similar effects for the ALSEP. “There was no indication 
of significant dust collection on the instrument's solar cells as a result of the lunar module 
ascent.”7
 
“The instrument measured a lunar surface temperature change of 330 F° during the eclipse. 
There was no indication of significant dust collection on the instrument's solar cells as a result of 
the lunar module ascent.”7
 
The LM ascent stage had as a launch pad the descent stage, which inhibited the impingement of 




The Apollo 12 Mission report described the mechanism causing erosion. “The type of erosion 
observed in the Apollo 11 and 12 landings is usually referred to as viscous erosion, which has 
been likened to the action of the wind blowing over sand dunes. The shearing force of the gas 
stream at the interface of the gas and lunar soil picks up weakly cohesive particles, injects them 
 
into the stream, and accelerates the particles to high velocities. The altitude at which this erosion 
is first apparent and the transport rate are dependent upon the surface loading caused by the 
engine exhaust plume and upon the mechanical properties of the local lunar soil. This 
dependence is expressed in terms of several characteristic parameters, such as engine chamber 
pressure, exit Mach number, material density, particulate size, and cohesion.”2
 
The Apollo 12 Preliminary Science report concludes, “The optical properties indicate that the 
lunar surface in the area of the Surveyor spacecraft has not received a new covering of dust nor 
been mechanically altered by the lunar environment during the 30 month. A significant change 
occurred in the reflectance of the Surveyor footpad over the 30-month span, the change may have 
been caused by microscopic mechanical alteration of the compressed surface.”12
 
The Apollo 12 Preliminary Science report, postulates ejecta as a cause for pitting observed on 
returned Surveyor components. “In addition to the possible meteoroid impacts, numerous surface 
effects of probable low-velocity origin were noted on the TV camera surface. In general, these 
low-velocity effects were shallow craters, and most were of recent origin, as indicated by their 
whiteness against the sandy-brown color of the painted surface of the TV camera housing. There 
was a definite concentration (10 to 100 times more) of these white craters on the side of the TV 
camera facing the LM, as compared with the other side of the camera. The number and density of 
these craters peaked at a region approximately directly in line with the LM. In addition, 
protuberances on the camera (such as screwheads, support struts, etc.) left dark shadows on the 
camera paint, which again pointed toward the LM. After a detailed examination of the geometry 
involved and by taking into account the relative angles of the shadowing, the TV camera, the 
Surveyor spacecraft, and the LM position, it was readily shown that the LM was the most 
probable origin for these craters. It is, therefore, postulated that in the final moments of landing, 
the LM generated a dust shower that affected the Surveyor 3 spacecraft and sandblasted that 
camera surface that faced toward the LM. This is the most significant examination of the 
Surveyor 3 TV camera to date. 
 
“The preliminary examination of the polished tube at low magnification revealed four craters 
that exhibited the characteristics of hypervelocity impacts. Subsequent detailed examination at 
higher optical magnifications has ruled out the possibility that one of these craters was caused by 
a hypervelocity impact.  The examination revealed the crater to be a surface pit caused by 
polishing, and the other three craters have not yet been identified positively as impact pits. 
Further analysis of these craters is proceeding. The detailed scan has established that the surface 
of the tube is covered with polishing scratches and gouges being easily mistaken for lipped 
hypervelocity craters.  There appears to be a marked concentration of surface effects on the same 
side of the tube as the deposit, and the significance of this correlation is currently being analyzed. 
 
“Both sections of the polished aluminum tube have been examined with a scanning electron 
microscope at up to 12,000- power magnification. At this power, it has been possible to observe 
suspected micrometeoritic craters in sufficient detail and examine the residue in some of them. 
Analysis of all the data obtained to date is in progress, and a comprehensive report will be made 
available at a later date.”12
 
The conclusions of this report appear to conflict. The observation that “the Surveyor spacecraft 
has not received a new covering of dust nor been mechanically altered by the lunar environment 
during the 30 month” period does not seem to agree with the postulation that “in the final 
moments of landing, the LM generated a dust shower that affected the Surveyor 3 spacecraft and 
sandblasted that camera surface that faced toward the LM.” One would assume that if the 
spacecraft was “sandblasted” the dust around the spacecraft would have been disturbed. Further, 
 
the crew felt that “it wasn’t blown on when we flew down in the LM, or rather that it had adhered 
to it over the years it had been in the crater.” 
   
Instruments in the vicinity of Apollo 14 and 15 LM ascent did not indicate any performance 




Scientific investigators performed numerous analyses on the camera since the preliminary report 
cited in the above. Findings of these results should be reviewed and, if discrepancies still exist, 
further investigations should be performed. The results should be used in LSAM descent module 
analysis and trade studies, particularly if erosion of spent LSAM descent stages is considered an 
issue. If evidence and analysis suggest probable undesirable damage to assets by lunar ejecta; 
then, dust management for lunar surface architecture and mission and hardware designs should be 
included in requirements. 
 
 
LUNAR MODULE CONTAMINATION 
 
Summary 
Lunar Module dust, dirt and debris contamination presented numerous challenges for several of 
the Apollo missions. The Apollo 12 crew observed that at 1/6-g the cabin atmosphere was 
excellent, however, after orbital insertion lunar dust filled the atmosphere and caused eye and 
nose irritation. The Apollo 14 crew observed little dust in the LM and cited no dust related 
problems. The floor of the Apollo 15 LM was dirty. The Apollo 16 crew appears to have had the 
most difficulty with dust, citing the following: Velcro on the floor was caked with dust; crew feet, 
hands and arms were covered with dust that was transferred into the suit upon donning; the 
midstep was covered with dust; eye and mouth irritation; and, the cabin fan in zero-g did not 
appear to clean the atmosphere. The crew of Apollo 17 cited sinus and nostril irritation after 




The Apollo 12 Mission report says, “Cabin repressurization after each extravehicular period was 
positive and rapid. Once inside the spacecraft, the dust on the suits became a significant 
problem.”2
 
Bean described effective cabin cleaning during Lunar Module depressurization. “The first cabin 
depressurization was pretty interesting because as soon as Al opened the depressurization valve 
after our 3.5-psi check, everything in the spacecraft disappeared out the valve. There was much 
outgassing, which is not unusual…I had seen it in Gemini. All loose particles that happened to be 
floating around disappeared from the spacecraft; it gives the spacecraft a real flush.”3
 
Bean spoke of LM ventilation, “Cabin atmosphere from activation planning was excellent. When 
we got back inside the first time, in one-sixth g, the atmosphere remained that way although we 
brought in quite a lot of dust. The same with the second time and the cabin jettison 
depressurization. Once we got into orbit in zero-g, there was a lot of dust and dirt floating 
around the cabin and we chose to remain in our suit loops as much as possible because of all this 
dirt, dust, and debris that was floating around. When we finally got back to the command module 
and docked with the CSM we wanted to figure a way to keep this dust and dirt from filling the 
command module, but we weren’t really sure how to do that.”3
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report describes LM cabin atmosphere and associated health hazards to 
the crew, “After ascent orbit insertion, when the spacecraft was again subject to a zero-g 
environment, a great quantity of dust and small particles floated free within the cabin. This dust 
made breathing without the helmet difficult and hazardous, and enough dust and particles were 
present in the cabin atmosphere to affect vision.”2
 
In the Apollo 14 debrief, Alan Shepard spoke of dust contamination. “We did find that we had to 
take the boots off because there’s so much dust in your overshoes that we did take those off before 
we went to bed.”4
 
Mitchell continued, “In training, we thought that maybe was an unnecessary time-consuming 
step and we’d probably sleep with the boots on, but they were so covered with crud that I didn’t 
want it sifting down in my face during sleep. We took them off.” 4
 
 
Shepard described dust contamination in the LM, “We had no problem with recharge, changing 
out batteries, [Portable Life Support System] PLSS feedwater collection, or dust control inside 
the cabin. We seemed to have a little extra dust on the floor. Other than that, it was not too bad.” 
4
 
Shepard described cleaning techniques, “We found that the brush that we had planned to use to 
dust off the suits was effective. It did take off the first layer of loose dust. I would suggest that 
jumping up and down on the footpad or stomping one’s boots on the ladder is just as effective 
with respect to the boots themselves. Just banging the boots against the ladder is enough to shake 
off that dust. From the boots on up the lower legs, backs of the legs, insides of the thigh, and so 
forth, the brush did appear to be fairly effective in getting the first layer of dust off.” 4
 
Scott, in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, described dust management techniques after EVA, 
“The first order of business after we got repress was to go through the checklist and do the EVA 
post and try and come up with a plan on how to handle all the dirt in the cabin. We were pretty 
dusty. We had planned prior to the flight to take the jettison bags and step into them with the suits 
to keep the lower portion of the suit isolated from the rest of the cabin. Our legs from about thigh 
down were just completely covered with dirt. I guess the dust brush worked fairly well. It got most 
of it, but we were still pretty dirty.”6
 
Scott continued, “We could have combined some things as we did do later. We were going sort of 
slow, feeling our way around the cabin, trying to get settled down to some sort of system to 
control the dirt and stay organized. I think the jettison bags over the legs worked fairly well. I 
think we kept the majority of the dirt out of the cabin and kept it in the bag. We just cinched it up 
around our legs. It was not problem getting in and out of our suits with the bags on them. We 
took another jettison bag and stuck it up on the midstep, and I stood on that to keep my [Constant 
Wear Garment] CWG clean. You stood on one of the [Oxygen Purge System] OPSs to keep off the 
floor, which was pretty dirty.” 6
 
During the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief, Young noted, “It was extremely clean until after the 
first EVA, and then from then on, it was really dirty.” 8
 
The Apollo 16 crew brought a lot of dust into the LM after each EVA. Young said, “EVA 3 Post 
Activities, “Repress was normal. Again we tracked a lot of dirt with us.” 8
 
Young provided insight into LM dust contamination, “You know all that Velcro on the floor, it 
just gets caked with dirt. You can’t stand on the floor. I guess it didn’t hurt anything, but I know 
when we donned the suit, we had our jettison bag down to stand on like everybody said, but our 
feet and hands and our arms were all full of dust when we put the suit on. So it was all going into 
the suit. And it didn’t seem to bother anything. You don’t know how much it’s going to bother. 
You don’t have a feel for whether it’s going to give you problems or not. There’s just no way to 
avoid it. The second EVA, we had in places that much dirt and dust on the floor and that’s after 
cleaning each other real good.” 8
 
Young continued, “We put a bag down on the floor to stand on, but that did not keep us from 
getting dust all over the place. One of the problems was that we had dust on the bottom of the 
PLSSs even though we wiped it off, and the dust on the side of the OPSs for some reason. They 
were lying on the floor. As a result, when we got in our LCGs, we were sort of standing around, 
like I had one foot on OPS and one foot on the midstep and was sort of leaning back against the 
shelf on my side. Charlie was sort of standing with his foot on the [Equipment Transfer Bag] ETB 
and one foot on the midstep, and we were up out of the dirt. Our hands were black when we 
 
started taking each other’s wrist rings off. We got our hands dirty and I didn’t get dirt off my 
hands until after we’d landed. Washed them up good. I don’t think Charlie did either. We 
managed to get dirt on the bottom of the LCGs, on our sleeves, and on our hands that got into the 
suits. It was just a little dust. I don’t know what problem it entailed, but it sure looked like it 
might become a problem. The only thing I can say is we stayed out of the dirt as best we could. It 
was all over the floor. Just hardly any way to get off of it. We even had some on the midstep 
where we’d laid the ETB up there. It was dust covered too from dropping it in the dirt because the 
[Lunar Equipment Conveyor] LEC was too long to keep it off the ground.”8
 
Wondering about the effects of cabin depressurization, Mattingly asked, “I was thinking about 
the subsequence depress. Did you have a lot of rocks and crud fly through there?”8
 
Young answered, “No, actually it cleaned the floor off pretty good. When I opened the door, the 
dirt would go ‘zip’ right out.” 8
 
The crew discussed LM atmospheric contamination and failure of the cabin ventilation system to 
remove dust. Duke comments, “We did one thing procedurally at insertion. We had a lot of dust 
and pebbles floating around in the cockpit with us. We did turn on the cabin fan and left helmets 
and gloves on until docking, because we had so much dust in there.” 8
 
Young responded, “That didn’t clear any dust out because you have to open the inflow valve to 
get any of that stuff in the suit loop to clean it out.” 8
 
Unidentified Speaker, “It just circulates around. It has a filter behind it.” 8
 
Unidentified Speaker, “Does it have a filter behind it?  Well, it didn’t clean much of the dust 
out.” 8
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report described LM contamination, “A major concern with 
housekeeping, on the post-extravehicular doffing of the pressure garment assemblies, was dust in 
the cabin. A jettison bag was placed over both legs of the suit and the suits were laid on the 
engine cover as prescribed. There was a considerable about of dust on the suits around the neck, 
around the helmet, on top of the oxygen purge system, and on the back of the portable life support 
system. Most of this dust ended up on the floor of the lunar module. The dust floor was cleaned by 
wetting a rag, caking the dust into mud and picking it up in the rag; however, there was no way 
to remove the dust from the Velcro on the floor. Since the Velcro does not restrain the crew to the 
floor in zero gravity, it is not needed.” 8
 
Schmitt, in the Apollo 17 Mission Debrief articulated nasal and sinus irritation and the 
effectiveness of LM cabin atmospheric management, “Cabin atmosphere was good, good 
ventilation, good odor cleaning…The dust clearing was good, considering the amount of dust we 
had. It was within a couple of hours after ingress. Although there was a lot of irritation, at least 
to my sinuses and nostrils, soon after taking the helmet off, about 2 hours later, that had 
decreased considerably.” 11
 
Describing LM cabin atmospheric conditions at zero-g, Cernan says, “The commander kept his 
helmet on throughout the rendezvous and docking. I took my gloves off after insertion and left 
them off. As soon as were hard docked, the commander took off his helmet. As I look back at that, 
because of dust debris in the LM spacecraft, I’m sorry I did. I could have left the helmet on, and 
would have had a lot less eye and mouth type of irritation. You knew you were in a very heavily 
infiltrated atmosphere in the LM because of the lunar dust. I don’t know how much lunar dust 
 
previous flights had, but I think we saved a great deal of grief by sweeping all the dust we could 
find in the floor into the holes and putting our tape covers over those holes. I think that had to 
help a great deal. There was an awful lot of dust on the floor that we didn’t see.” 11
 
 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
Bean described cleaning suits in the Apollo 12 Technical Debrief, “One other thing, we tried to 
dust each other off. Usually, it was Pete trying to dust me off. I would get up on the ladder and he 
would try to dust me off with his hands, but we didn’t have a lot of luck. We should have some 
sort of whisk broom on the MESA. Before we get back in, we’ll dust each other up high. Then the 
LMP will get on the ladder and the CDR will give him a dust or vice versa and then we will get 
on in. We are bringing too much dust into the LM. Another possibility is that just as soon as you 
get in you slip on some sort of second coveralls that fit over the feet on up to the waist, because 
that’s the dirty area. Then you keep that on all the time you’re in the LM and take it off just 
before you get out. The other alternative to this is that you put on a similar something when 
you’re getting out onto the lunar surface. The reason I suggested the former was that I think you 
want to be as free as you can possibly be when on the lunar surface. Adding another garment 
over the top of the already existing equipment is going to be restrictive and might give you a few 
more problems.”3
 
The Apollo 14 Mission report says, “On previous missions, dust carried into the cabin during 
ingress was a problem. However, it did not seem to be a problem on Apollo 14, perhaps because 
there was less dust on the lunar surface, or perhaps, being aware of the problem made the crew 
more meticulous in contamination control that they would have been otherwise. Care was taken 
to remove the dust from the pressure garment assembly and other equipment before entry into the 
cabin. The brush that was used for pressure garment assembly was adequate. The technique of 
stomping the boots against the lunar module ladder seemed to help to some extent.” 11
 
After their Apollo 16 experience, the crew recommended removing Velcro from the floor, “I 
would like to see the Velcro taken off the flight floor, because it sure got dusty.”8
 
Young replied, “Sure did.” 8
 
Duke said, “Make it terrible to clean. If you took that Velcro off you could take a damp cloth and 
swab the floor.” 8
 
Young added, “All that dust and mud and throw it in a jettison bag.” 8
 
Duke replied, “But with the Velcro there, you couldn’t do that.” 8
 
Young said, “For the short time you’ll be in zero-g, you could use the tie downs.” 8
 
Duke agreed, “That’s right.” 8
 
Young noted, “You’re going to be in there suited anyway.” 8
 
Duke added, “In fact you want to float free in zero gravity at least I did. I felt more comfortable 
floating. And the hoses really did restrain you to some degree. The Velcro didn’t work. I tried that 
and I just came right up off the floor.” 8
 
 
Young agreed, “I guess I agree, Charlie. I don’t think you lose anything by getting rid of the 
Velcro, but you would sure get rid of a lot of dirt.” 8
 
Apollo 17 Mission report explained taping the LM floor prior to ascent, “Prior to ascent from the 
lunar surface, the cabin activities included covering all holes in the lunar module floor into which 
dust had collected could be swept. Although considerable dust appeared in the cabin upon 




Dust was brought into the Lunar Module during ingress after EVA. The source of contamination 
was dust, soil, and debris covered extravehicular activity units, samples, and equipment. The 
mechanism of contamination and recommendations for removing dust from these sources is 
discussed in Section 6 of this report. 
 
Numerous operational and engineering solutions were implemented to manage dust inside the LM 
cabin. They include: 
 
 Jettison bags were used to contain dust on space suits 
 Dust brushes worked well in some cases 
 Wet wiping surfaces 
 Jumping and stomping boots against the LM ladder 
 Crews were meticulous in contamination control 
 Covering all the holes in the LM floor prior to ascent 
 
Some problems were not corrected during the Apollo Program. The root cause of the LM cabin 




Although dust cleaning procedures and technologies will be developed to lessen the amount of 
dust brought into the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM), total removal of dust is not feasible. 
Therefore, atmospheric revitalization and cleaning technologies and operations will probably be 
required to manage risks presented by lunar dust contamination. The crews noted that the 
combination of zero-g and depressurization was effective cleaning the CM cabin. This technique 
may be considered as well. 
 
Engineers and Operators should review this report and other historical documents to gain insight 
into techniques and equipment that were effective and ineffective during the Apollo Program. 
 
Operational Scenarios and Concept of Operations should be developed to identify and evaluate 
air revitalization and airlock concepts for LSAM and Habitats. Dust management requirements 
should be created for incorporation into requirements for LSAM and Habitat projects. Trade 
studies should be performed to identify existing technologies and perform technology gap 
analyses for each concept. These activities should be phased to accommodate scheduled missions 
defined by NASA’s Constellation Program. 
 
 
CONTAMINATION DURING TRANSFER BETWEEN LM AND CSM 
 
Summary 
After docking, equipment and space suits were transferred from the LM to the Command Module 
(CM). During the transfer, dust, soil and debris contaminated the CM to varying degrees. 
 
The Apollo 11 crew vacuumed suits, samples and equipment in the LM before transferring these 
items to the CM. Because the suction was low, this was a tedious job. The vacuum used in Apollo 
12 did not remove dust from the space suits, but was used to brush dust off sample boxes. Dust 
and debris in the LM impeded transfer operations and although the gear that was transferred was 
filthy, very little dust was transferred to the CM. In Apollo 14, the vacuum performed 
satisfactorily and very little dust was transferred to the CM. The cabin fan filter cleaned the 
atmosphere well. The vacuum and the cabin fan used in Apollo 15 worked well. During Apollo 
16, the vacuum cleaner and cabin fans failed resulting in severe CM contamination. This was 
exacerbated by a decision to postpone LM jettison. The CM filled up with dust and rocks 
immediately and dust coated all the surfaces within an hour. The Apollo 17 tunnel transfer went 
smoothly. A small amount of dust was transferred to the CM; however, the cleaning control 




The Apollo 11 Mission report describes preparing items for transfer from the LM to the CM, 
“Following docking, the tunnel was cleared and the probe and drogue were stowed in the lunar 
module. The items to be transferred to the command module were cleaned using a vacuum brush 
attached to the lunar module suit return hose. The suction was low and made the process rather 
tedious. The sample return containers and film magazines were placed in appropriate bags to 
complete the transfer and the lunar module was configured for jettison according to the checklist 
procedure.”1
 
Conrad spoke of tunnel transfer operations in the Apollo 12 Technical Debrief, “Tunnel 
operations were smooth as glass. The LM was filthy dirty and it had so much dust and debris 
floating around in it that I took my helmet off and almost blinded myself. I immediately got my 
eyes full of junk, and had to put my helmet back on. I told Al to leave his on. We left the helmets 
on and took off our gloves. Once we got stabilized and had the hatches open and everything, the 
flow system of having the command module more positive than the LM seemed to work. We did 
not pick up much debris in the command module; very little, if any, that was floating in the LM. 
But, it stayed very good in the LM all the way through our checklist.3
 
“We tried to vacuum clean each other down, which was a complete farce. In the first place, the 
vacuum didn’t knock anything off that was already on the suits. It didn’t suck anything, but we 
went through the exercise. It did clean the rock boxes, that much I’ll say for it. I don’t think it 
sucked up any of the dust but it brushed the dirt off the boxes. We put them in their proper 
containers, and transferred them. 3
 
“Dick brought over the LiOH B-5 and 6. We stowed those and it took a long tome to get all the 
gear transferred. Then Al and I, because we and the spacecraft were so dirty, stripped naked and 
transferred the suits up to Dick. He stowed them under the couch and let us come in dirty and 
pack our own suits to keep himself and the spacecraft as clean as possible. We packed the two 
suits in the lower part of the L-shaped bag, and to my knowledge we had very little debris come 
across from the LM.” 3
 
 
Conrad continued, “During that time Dick was busy and Al and I were naked. We didn’t have any 
clothes on; we wanted to get cleaned up after we had stashed everything because all of gear we 
were stashing was dirty.” 3
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report adds, “The transfer of equipment between both vehicles was 
impeded by the large amounts of dust and debris in the lunar module. Therefore, the timeline 
became very tight in meeting the schedule for lunar module jettison.” 2
 
The Apollo 14 crew described tunnel transfer operations in the Technical Debrief. Mitchell 
explains, “I think we probably got our suits off a little earlier than the checklist called for. It 
certainly improved our mobility. One of the first things you do after you get the tunnel open is get 
those suits off and get them brushed down and stowed. It makes it a lot roomier in the cockpit and 
gives you easier access to everything in the cabin. We were a little bit hesitant when we planned, 
in the time line, to remove our suits that early in the game because of the dust problem. But we 
went ahead, took a chance on it, and wrote it that way. Since we didn’t have any dust, it worked 
out real well.” 4
 
Shepard added, “The vacuuming procedures seemed to be satisfactory. I think with each pass 
with the vacuum brush, you could see the dust coming off. In other words, you make a pass or two 
on the side for example, or on the back, and you’d see the loose dust, off the top, that was still 
there, come off into the vacuum cleaning bag. So, that is an effective procedure. At least, you 
remove just one more layer of dust. Of course, the smudges were still there. I think that, as a 
general comment, using the procedures that we used, as written, we got very little dust back in the 
command module. The things that were dirty, the suits, were put away in bags right away. Stu 
was ready for them and they went into the bags, the L-shaped bag. The rock boxes and so on were 
in the extra decontamination bags. I thought the command module was remarkably clean. It was 
a lot cleaner than I had expected it to be.” 4
 
Roosa added, “I thought it was exceptionally clean. When you passed the suits over to me, they 
were dirty, but they weren’t dusty. In other words, there was no loose dust coming off the suits. 
The only dust that came off was when as I was shoving them into the bag; but that was a contact 
thing. There was nothing floating free at all from the suits.” 4
 
Apollo 14 Mission report said, “On previous lunar missions, lunar surface dust adhering to 
equipment being returned to earth has created a problem in both spacecraft.  The special dust 
control procedures and equipment used on this mission were effective in lowering the overall 
level of dust.” 5
 
Apollo 14 Mission report reiterated the effectiveness of cleaning operations. “A vacuum cleaner 
assembly and cabin fan filter, used for the first time, along with the normal decontamination 
procedures eliminated practically all of the objectionable dust such as that present after the 
Apollo 12 lunar docking. The fans were operated for approximately 4 hours after lunar docking.” 
5
 
In the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, Scott described the effectiveness of the vacuum cleaner in 
containing dust in the LM, “The vacuum cleaner worked pretty good I thought. We brought the 
vacuum cleaner over to the LM and just turned it on and let it run. It did a pretty good job of 
clearing the dust out. We were pretty dirty.” 6
 
 
Worden added, “The vacuum cleaner is a big bulky piece of gear, we were all surprised at how 
effective it was in flight. It really worked out well.” 6
 
Scott agreed, “I thought it did, too. We stowed the [Commander] CDR and [Lunar Module Pilot] 
LMP suits in the L-shape bag, to get the dirt out of the cabin. We left Al’s suit out because of the 
bulk. Al’s suit was still clean. We put the filter on the cabin fans and turned the cabin fans on. We 
already talked about the foreign object in the cabin fan which we heard periodically. When the 
cabin fan was running with that filter, I thought it did an excellent job of cleaning the cabin. You 
could sure see the particulate matter floating around there after we finished with the transfer.” 6
 
In the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief, Mattingly described preparation for tunnel transfer, “After 
docking, we went through our transfer items even though we knew we were going to be retaining 
the LM and going to bed. From my side, the time line entering the LM was a little bit slower than 
I had anticipated even though I pressurized the cabin prior to rendezvous. Taking things out and 
finding a place for them just seems to take a little bit longer. Perhaps that was because I’m 
methodical about it. The first thing we did was pass in the vacuum cleaner. I had checked the 
vacuum cleaner operation to the extent that I turned it on and it worked and I turned it off. I 
didn’t try to vacuum clean anything. I didn’t try to verify that it really was sucking anything up. 
There’s some question in my mind whether the vacuum cleaner really ever worked properly.” 8
 
Duke answered, “It did. The screen was covered with dust. It probably was so covered that it 
stalled out, and that’s what failed it.” 8
 
Mattingly explains the vacuum cleaner failure. “In any event, some time later, I went into the 
tunnel to get something, and the vacuum cleaner was laying there making some funny little noise. 
I noticed the switch was on, but it didn’t sound like it was running, so I turned it off. It didn’t 
interest me enough to see if it was still working. I think it had probably failed then. We tried it 
later and it wouldn’t start after that; it would just make this little hum. I suspect it failed at the 
time I found it the first time. That was within an hour of the time we started with it.” 8
 
Apollo 16 Mission report explains tunnel transfer problems associated with vacuum cleaner 
failure.  “The vacuum cleaner failed after less than 1 hour of use while attempting to clean items 
in the lunar module that were to be transferred to the command module…During the equipment 
transfer, a large amount of dust had begun floating around and much of it was transferred to the 
command module cabin. The vacuum cleaner failed after it had been used for about 20 minutes. 
Therefore, all the dust could not be collected. Most of the sample collection bags were free of 
dust and debris and the only things that really needed cleaning were the deep core sample and 
the big rock bags. Dust particles in the lunar module cabin atmosphere did provide some 
hindrance to the crew during the unsuiting and the dry-out period.”9
 
Apollo 16 Mission report described the vacuum cleaner failure, “The vacuum cleaner failed after 
becoming clogged with dust. The vacuum cleaner was cleaned postflight and it operated 
properly. The design of the vacuum cleaner is such that lunar dust can clog the impeller.” 9
 
Mattingly described CM conditions and cabin fan failure. “The command module filled up with 
LM dust and rocks and things almost immediately. Within an hour, it was very noticeable that 
there was a coating of dust on all the instrument panels and all the surfaces. You’d see little rocks 
float by in front of your nose. I was surprised how rapidly that stuff all had diffused in. It came 
over as soon as we brought the first bag or the first suit, or whatever it was. That stuff was just 
coming off of everything and it never stopped. The command module cabin fans were on at the 
time of docking. I turned them on right after docking and before removing any tunnel hatch 
 
equipment. They were working properly at that point with the cabin fan filter on. They failed 
some time EVA morning. The material we brought in we just stashed away.” 8
 
The report then described CM contamination, “Once the transfer of equipment from the lunar 
module began, the command module cockpit became noticeably dusty with quite a few rock chops 
floating around. The dust could be found on almost all surfaces although there was never any 
problem with the floating dust.” 8
 
Duke described tunnel transfer operations. “We tried to vacuum the suits and some of the bags 
that were dirty like the big rock bags and found it almost totally worthless. You could do a little 
bit, but the best method was to take a damp towel to wipe things down. We were able to get some 
of the dust off this way. Fortunately, most of the things that were dusty went over in DCON bags. 
That was a lifesaver. Once we opened one of the DCON bags just a little bit to see what bag was 
in there. The dust just floated out and we closed that in a hurry. That was a real mistake. I think 
Apollo 14 did the same thing. The transfer of the equipment was expeditiously done just 
according to the Time Line Book from my side. Ken was doing a great job taking care of 
everything as I passed it over. Had we been on a nominal two-rev-to-jett time line, we’d have 
been adequately prepared to jettison the LM at the time. I think it’s a very loose time line. I think 
Ken does have time to stow things, at least temporarily, and we don’t just throw them in there.” 8
 
He continued, “The samples did not need to be vacuumed except one bag before I put it in the 
DCON bag. That was the big rock bag. Everything else was in good shape. Since we are going to 
retain [the LM] …[we] could have jettisoned the LM by keeping our suits on. But that was not the 
decision. The decision was to keep it. So, we had to take the suits off. John and I both doffed the 
suits in the LM. I thought it was quite a hazard over there floating through the LM with all that 
dust and debris. A number of times I got my eyes full of dust and particles. I felt my right eye was 
scratched slightly once.” 8
 
The Apollo 17 Mission report described post-docking activities. “The post-docking activities in 
the lunar module and the command and service module were accomplished as planned with the 
checklist as an inventory list and as a backup to common sense. The vacuum cleaner was 
operated continuously in the lunar module to remove dust floating in the cabin. As a result of this 
operation and the special attention paid to the bagging and sealing of the samples prior to 
transfer, the command module remained remarkably dust free. During vacuum cleaner checkout, 
a main bus B undervoltage light was illuminated; however, there were no caution and warning 
lights when the vacuum cleaner was used for the lunar module post-docking activities. 
Preparation for lunar module jettisoning was normal through hatch closure.”10
 
Cernan, in the Apollo 17 Technical Debrief spoke of Tunnel Transfer operations, “The 
commander had his helmet and gloves off all throughout the entire transfer. We handled the 
transfer the way we’d planned. The LM pilot did most of the preparation of the gear in the LM, 
and the commander stayed in the tunnel and passed things on. The inventory was going on in the 
command module side and on the LM side, both. We vacuumed each other other’s suits the best 
we could and everything else that got supposedly transferred, unbagged, or uncovered.”11
 
The crew discussed cleanliness of the CM. Schmitt remarked, “In spite of the CMP’s comments 
to the contrary, I think we got things remarkably clean. There wasn’t an awful lot of dirt in the 
command module coming back.” 11
 
Evans said, “That’s true.” 11
 
 
Schmitt continued, “In contrast, he may have thought it was dirty, but I was surprised we were 
able to keep the level of contamination in the command module down.” 11
 
Cernan observed, “After I took my helmet off, I could go halfway through the tunnel and stick my 
head up in the command module, and it was a totally refreshed, unpolluted atmosphere up there. 
It never did get polluted.” 11
 
Schmitt reflected, “I think having that vacuum cleaner running in the LM had a lot to do with 
keeping the flow in the other direction, filtering out the air.” 11
 
Evans added, “We never did vacuum in the command module because it just wasn’t necessary.” 
11
 
Schmitt said, “The suits were noticeably cleaned by the vacuum cleaner. You could tell you were 
pulling stuff off them, although they were still dirty. I think most of the dust was taken care of.” 11
 
Cernan commented, “Cleaning control in the command module was excellent, considering all the 
dust and dirt that just seemed to adhere to everything in the LM. When we got back in the 
command module, with the exception of the suits, and LMP and CDR, everything was clean. 
Everything was clean because everything was bagged before we brought it over – bagged and 
zipped. We never did open anything once we got it zipped up. So the command module stayed 
exceptionally clean throughout the remainder of the flight.” 11
 
Schmitt added, “In the bagging of the decontamination bags, I made a special effort, after 
requests prelaunch, to pull those zippers as tight as I could. They should be pretty tight.” 11
 
 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
In the Apollo 12 Technical Debrief, Bean recommended, “I think the procedures should be 
developed so that a positive flow of air is maintained from the command module to the LM, not 
necessarily to keep lunar bugs out of the command module, but to keep all this dust and dirt out 
of the command module.” 3  
 
Bean also recommended, “I think this is completely unsatisfactory, and there must be some way 
to clean up that cabin atmosphere so that you can work in a good, acceptable environment when 
you do get back to the command module. It’s possible that you could get up and dock with the 
command module before you open the upper hatch, dump the cabin down to 3-1/2 psi, and hope it 
doesn’t blow a lot of the dirt and debris out of there, then slowly fill the cabin up in the command 
module and that will keep it filled. There ought to be some way to do this job.”3
 
In the Apollo 14 Technical Debrief, the crew discussed lessons learned and recommendations. 
Mitchell said, “I’d recommend that to future crews: get the suits off as soon as you can.” 4
 
Shepard adds, “We felt the procedures that were suggested, perhaps by Apollo 12, and carried 
out in our time line, certainly reduced the dust to a minimum.” 4
 
Apollo 14 Mission report said, “A vacuum cleaner with detachable bags was added to assist in 
removing lunar dust from suits and equipment prior to intravehicular transfer from the lunar 





During the Apollo Program lessons learned in each mission were incorporated in subsequent 
missions that improved tunnel transfer operations. These improvements included: 
 
 Maintaining the CM at a positive pressure differential to the LM 
 Improved vacuum cleaning equipment and procedures 
 Removing suits before beginning tunnel transfer operations 
 Securing decontamination bags 
 
The root cause of the contamination problems associated with tunnel transfer operations, LM 




Interface requirements for CEV to LSAM and associated engineering design solutions developed. 
Possible requirements may be to maintain a positive differential pressure to the LSAM and 
limitations on dust transferred to the CM. 
 
 
COMMAND MODULE CONTAMINATION 
 
Summary 
Command Module lunar dust contamination varied with each Apollo mission. During Apollo 12 
transearth coast dust permeated the whole command module. The Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH) 
filters were not collecting dust and the Environmental Control System (ECS) system pumped it 
back out the hoses where it collected onto circuit breakers; the vacuum cleaner system did not 
work well; and the dust caused eye and nose irritation. The Apollo 14 CM was relatively clean. 
The crew of Apollo 15 cleaned the screens everyday as the inlet to the cabin fans and return line 
collected a lot of dust. During Apollo 16, pebbles and rocks floated around the CM cabin and the 
crew was concerned about the risk of those going through their dump valves. The cabin fan inlet 





Bean, in the Apollo 12 Technical Debrief described CM contamination.  
“We were plagued by it when we finally did get back into the command module. Pete and I had to 
remove our hoses so that we could use them for vacuum cleaners. Incidentally, they didn’t 
perform too well. There wasn’t enough vacuum there. We had to remove our helmets from our 
suits, to keep our eyes from burning and our noses from inhaling these small particles floating 
around; we just left our helmets sitting on the tops of our heads. This isn’t a very good 
configuration to be in, but we had not other alternatives at the time.” 3
 
Conrad explained CM contamination.  
“However, something we found out later and not until we got back to the ship, was that the fine 
dust was on the suits and on almost all of the equipment that was contained inside the bags. The 
dust is so fine and in zero g it tended to float off the equipment and it must have permeated the 
whole command module. It floated out of those bags; it floated out of the contingency sample bag. 
This we could see any time we opened up (which we stopped doing right away) the LiOH 
container that had the contingency sample in it. The whole thing was just a cloud of fine dust 
floating around in there. You could actually see it just float out of the bag through the zipper; and 
you can forget those zippers. They don’t hold anything in. When we got all the gear back here 
and opened it up, back on the carrier, we found out that it had all cleaned itself. That was where 
all this dirt was coming from in the command module. The dirt is so fine I don’t think the LiOH 
filters were taking it all out. It would pump it in the ECS system and pump it back out the hoses. 
This was indicated by Dick’s blue suit hose, which we had tied over the left-hand side and was 
blowing on panel 8 circuit breaker panel. That whole thing was just one big pile of dust that was 
collected on the circuit breakers. The only reason it’s there is the ECS hose was blowing on it. 
It’s got to have taken the dust in through the LiOH canisters and filters and everything and blown 
it back out the blue hose. So the system is not doing the cleaning, the dust is too fine.”3
 
Apollo 12 Mission report described the cleaning effect of zero-g.  
“During the transearth coast phase, it was noticed that much of the dust which had adhered to 
equipment while on the lunar surface had floated free in the zero-g condition, leaving the 
equipment relatively clean. This fact was also true of the suits, since they were not as dusty after 
flight as they were on the surface after final ingress.” 2
 
On the subject of cabin atmospheric cleaning, Shepard, in the Apollo 14 Technical Debrief said, 
“Yes, that’s got to be a pretty effective system (not only the return hoses, but also the cabin 
 
screen) of clearing that cabin atmosphere. We were obviously picking up lint and the system kept 
the cabin very clean and very few things came floating around, except for a little while after Stu 
opened the rock bag right in front of everybody on television.” 4
 
Mitchell commented on the effectiveness of repress in cleaning the cabin.  
“A lot of that dust, I believe, kind of got whipped outside when we did our dump repress. The 
cabin dust kind of swirled around. A lot of that went out through the relief valve at that point, 
which might have reduced it somewhat.” 4
 
The Apollo 14 Mission report says, “The procedures for contamination control in the command 
module were quite satisfactory, and particles were not observed in the command module 
subsequent to hatch opening.” 5
 
In the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, Scott commented on the ECS. 
“I was surprised how clean the spacecraft was. I think most of the dust had been removed. That’s 
right. It surely had.” 6
 
Irwin added, “That night, it was fairly clean, you know, when we went to sleep. I don’t know how 
all that dust got out of there.” 6
 
Scott agreed, “Yes, the ECS does a pretty good job of cleaning the place out. The smell was gone. 
But that had all cleaned out. By the time we got up the next morning things were in pretty good 
shape.” 6
 
The Apollo 15 crew discussed CM dust contamination, Worden said, “When we got up the next 
morning, the cabin was as clean as it was before the initial separation. Cleaning the screens was 
another thing we were doing quite often. Especially post-lunar-orbit activities, when we had all 
the dirt. We had to get around and clean those screens at least daily. We’d lost, somehow, two of 
them. One or two? … The cabin fan filter is on the output side of the cabin fans. We noticed on 
the way home, that inlet to the cabin fans seemed to be the thing that was collecting all the dust 
and dirt. That’s like a register in a home; it’s just a metal grill. There seemed to be a lot of dust 
and particles collecting around that, and we could see it some of the hardware inside that metal 
grill.” 6
 
Irwin added, “It was an inner grill. There was an inner grill there that seemed to be collecting a 
lot of dust and debris, and we couldn’t get to that. I don’t recall seeing anything in the cabin fan 
filter. It didn’t seem to be collecting anything, because everything seemed to be collecting on the 
return line.” 6
 
Scott continues, “Yes. We looked in the cabin fan filter, and we took it off on the inside.”6
 
Worden agreed, “That’s right, and it looked pretty clean to me. It just surprised me that we had a 
cabin fan filter there.” 6
 
Apollo 16 Mission report described problems with the cabin fan.   
“The cabin fan filter was installed on the first day of the flight. After rendezvous, the cabin fan 
was turned on prior to opening the lunar module hatch and ran continuously until after 
transearth injection when it made a very load moaning noise and was turned off. The cabin fan 
inlet screen was generally covered with a great deal of trash. After the fan was turned off, a piece 
of paper was taped over the cabin fan inlet screen in an attempt to retain the dust within the 
 
ducting. There was no problem with dirt coming out of the duct, even when the fan filter was 
removed for entry. 9
 
“When the spacecraft was received for postflight testing, the cabin heat exchanger inlet duct 
screens were blocked with lint and debris with paper taped over the screens. However, this had 
no effect on the operation of the fans. Operation and sound level were normal and the fan current 
was within specification. Visual inspection of the fans did not show any nicks or indications of 
interference. Two small pieces of gray tape, approximately ¼ inch in diameter and dust were 
found on the cabin exhaust filter. 9
 
“The most probable cause for the fan noise was some object which got into the fan and was later 
freed.” 9
 
Duke, in the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief, observed, “We saw a few dust particles fly our way but 
that was all. To do the actual depress we used the overhead valve and just left it open. I never 
noticed much floating away. The LM was extremely clean. You know how many screws and 
washers and things we found floating in the command module. I guess maybe on the whole flight 
we found five in the LM the whole time.” 8
 
The crew discussed their concern with pebbles and rocks floating around the CM cabin. Young 
said, “…we had a lot of pebbles and rocks that were on the suit that we didn’t get cleaned off and 
on the [Lunar Extravehicular Visor Assembly] LEVAs and on everything else that we brought 
back. We were sitting there and there were at least four or five pebbles and rocks that came 
floating by. That stuff can go through your dump valve and it gets lodged in there so you couldn’t 
close it. That would be a bad thing. I know that’s a big valve and a big hole, but I assume that 
there’s something that size that could get through there. Sure would be good to have a screen 
over it, I think.” 8
 
 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
Mattingly recommended in the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief, “Seems like you ought to have a 
screen, or you ought to have a thorough understanding that the inlet is the minimum cross 
section. Anything that gets started in there is going to keep going. Even then I think a screen is 
the proper answer, because there’s just no way you could get in there and operate on that thing 
and clean it out. The only thing I could think of to do was if it didn’t seal, I figured a rock would 
crush in the thing, a lot of mechanical advantage. But for something like those little screws that 




Two mechanisms for contamination were observed; 1) transfer of dust covered equipment, 
samples and space suits into the CM and 2) dust inside sample containers released into the 
atmosphere. 
 
The command modules had good air cleaning systems to manage lunar dust contamination. The 
exception was on Apollo 16, which had failures in fans and the vacuum cleaner. 
 
Redesigned sample return containers to maintain vacuum during trans-lunar and transearth flight 





Constellation will develop a strategy to manage dust; however, dust contamination will most 
likely not be completely eliminated. Requirements for the CEV Command Module should be 
developed for air revitalization, air filtration and secure sample storage based on Human Research 
Standards and Scientific Investigation needs. 
 
 
MECHANISMS FOR LUNAR MODULE CONTAMINATION 
 
Summary 
During each Apollo Surface EVA dust collected on surfaces and was transferred to the Lunar 
Module causing the contamination described in that section of this report. Although not 
specifically mentioned in the Mission Reports or Technical Debriefs, historical video footage 
recorded the crews experiencing dust contamination due to falling on the lunar surface and being 
covered by dust. 
 
During Apollo 12, the Equipment Transfer Bag strap was covered with dust and was transferred 
to Pete Conrad’s space suit. The LiOH box fell off the conveyor and was covered with dust. The 
end of the strap of the Lunar Surface Conveyor rested on the surface and collected dust that was 
subsequently deposited on the crew and transferred to the LM. The Apollo 12 crew appeared to 
encountered greater dust contamination than the Apollo 11 crew, which caused greater LM 
contamination. This is most likely a function of the amount of time spent on the lunar surface. 
The Apollo 12 crew spent more time on the surface. 
 
The Apollo 15 crew encountered dust contamination while transferring the Sample Return 
Container using the Lunar Equipment Conveyor. The seat bags, under the seat pan of the Lunar 
Roving Vehicle (LRV) were full of dust. One crew member fell down after tripping while 
backing up in soft soil. 
 
During Apollo 16 EVAs, strap-on pockets filled with dust that upon ingress to the LM fell 
opened, allowing the dust to fall on the LM floor. The LRV lost a fender causing dust to rain 
down on the crew, LRV, and equipment. The extravehicular mobility units were covered with 
small dust clots. 
 







The Apollo 12 Mission report described dust contamination, “The amount of lunar dust 
encountered by the Apollo 12 crew appeared to be appreciably greater than in Apollo 11. This 
condition manifested itself by contaminating the atmospheres in both spacecraft and depositing 
dust over much of the lunar surface equipment and onboard systems. The cohesive properties of 
lunar dust in a vacuum, augmented by electrostatic properties, tend to make it adhere to anything 
it contacts. These properties diminish in the presence of the gas of an atmosphere. Upon attaining 
zero gravity, some of the lunar dust floats up in the cabin atmosphere and becomes widely 
dispersed. This process tends to be continuous, and renders present atmosphere filtration 
techniques inadequate. The presence of the lunar dust in the cabin of either spacecraft does not 
detrimentally affect the operation of onboard systems, but the dust could present a hazard to crew 
health, and at least it constitutes a nuisance. The potential health hazards are eye and lung 
contamination when the dust floats in zero g. In an effort to minimize this nuisance on future 
flights various dust removal techniques were evaluated for cleaning the spacesuits and equipment 
on the lunar surface prior to ingressing the lunar module.”2
 
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report explained problems with dust contamination. “Because of the dust 
problem, the lower limbs of the liquid-cooled ferments were dirty. Each crewman had to help the 
other crewman remove his suit. Consequently, there was appreciable dust on each crewman’s 
hands and up to the elbows of the liquid-cooled garments. There is not way to avoid this problem; 





Slippery conditions on the Lunar Surface did not appear to present a problem for Apollo 
astronauts. According to the Apollo 11 Mission report slippery conditions on the ladder were not 
dangerous, “Movements in the 1/6-g environment were slow enough to allow deliberate foot 
placement after the jump. The ladder was a bit slippery from the powdery surface material, but 
not dangerously so.”1
 
Alan Bean in the Apollo 12 Technical Debrief states that he did not experience slippery 
conditions. “I never noticed any slippery surfaces as Neil and Buzz pointed out. The ground 
never felt slippery at all to me.”  Pete Conrad followed up with, “I didn’t notice any 
slipperiness.”3
 
In the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, Irwin described falling while performing surface operations, 
“I was pulling on the lanyard with one hand and trying to take pictures with the other. And of 
course I fell down there once because I tripped backing up in that soft soil.” 8
 
Cables and Cords 
 
Cables and cords presented a tripping hazard to all the crews during the Apollo Program. 
Although crews mentioned that this problem was a result of dust, the record appears to point to 
other root causes. The Apollo 11 Mission report described trip hazards to the crew resulting from 
equipment cords in the work area. “The television system presented no difficulties except that the 
cord was continuously getting in the way. At first, the white cord showed up well, but it soon 
became covered with dust and was therefore more difficult to see. The cable had a ‘set’ from 
being coiled around the reel and would not lie completely flat on the surface. Even when it was 
flat, however, a foot could still slide under, and the Commander became entangled several 
times.”  
 
 In the anomaly resolution section, the report continues discussion. “The cable for the lunar 
surface television camera retained it coiled shape after being deployed on the lunar surface. 
Loops resulting from the coils represented a potential tripping hazard to the crew. All the 
changes that have been investigated relative to changes in cable material and in stowage and 
deployment hardware have indicated only minimal improvement in deployed cable form, together 
with a weight penalty for the change. No hardware changes are planned. This anomaly is 
closed.”1
 
During Apollo 12, Alan Bean states during the Technical Debrief, “One thing that continually 
disturbed us the whole time, particularly Pete, was the fact that the TV cable was right in front of 
the MESA. Our TV cable laid flat on the ground. It didn’t tend to curl up or anything like that; 
but, because it rests on top of the dust and your feet go beneath the dust, you end up pushing the 
cable around quite a bit. I think this is a completely unsatisfactory situation and I would 
recommend that that connect for the TV be moved either over to quadrant 3 or quadrant 1 so that 
the TV cable would never have to be in the vicinity of the MESA or the area near the front of the 
 
ladder. It’s just too highly traveled an area to have something like that TV cable underfoot. We 
never fell over it but it was just a constant problem trying to avoid it.”3
 
Scott, in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief mentioned tripping over a wire. “Oh yes. That reminds 
me of aligning the electrical box on the heat flow. After the initial alignment and all the shuffling 
around there with the probes and all, at one point I tripped over one of the wires to the probe and 
I moved the electrical box from its alignment position. I think the ground called up and we didn’t 
have all the photos, I started digging the trench.” 6
 
Young, in the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief said, “The second problem, which was a continual 
one was the battery cable. Even though I didn’t deploy the battery too far out in the sunshine the 
battery cable had a mind of its own and insisted on staying 4 inches off the ground around the 
camera where I was walking, even though I pulled the whole thing back in there. So, every time I 
walked around the camera I had to pick my feet up to avoid the battery cable and 2 to 3 times I 




The Apollo 11 Mission report discussed problems with the Lunar Equipment Conveyor.  “The 
initial operation of the lunar equipment conveyor in lowering the camera was satisfactory, but 
after the straps had become covered with lunar surface material, a problem arose in transporting 
the equipment back into the lunar module. Dust from this equipment fell back onto the lower 
crewmember and into the cabin and seemed to bind the conveyor so as to require considerable 
force to operate it. Alternatives in transporting equipment into the lunar module had been 
suggested before the flight, and although there was no opportunity to evaluate these techniques, it 
is believed they might be an improvement over the conveyor.”1
 
Pete Conrad described suit contamination while using the Equipment Transfer Bag during the 
Apollo 12 Technical Debrief. “The problem is that the lower end of the strap got completely 
covered with dust and I got dust all over my hands and over my suit arms from handling that 
strap.”3
 
Conrad described LiOH box contamination. “When I removed the first LiOH box on the first EVA 
to send it up, that one fell off and I had to pick it up out of the dirt. Once it gets in the dirt, forget 
it.”3
 
Bean observed, “There’s no way to dust anything off there, which brings up a good point that 
we’ll be covering in a few minutes concerning when we got back in.” 3
 
The Apollo 12 Mission Technical report stated, “The single-strap lunar surface conveyor was 
easy to deploy and generally performed satisfactorily. The end of the strap resting on the surface 
collects dust, which is subsequently deposited on the crewmen and in the lunar module cabin.”2
 
Shepard in the Apollo 14 Mission Debrief described dust effects of the Modularized Equipment 
Transporter. “I really expected more dust to be collected by the tires and thrown up on the MET. 
That didn’t turn out to be the case at all. We dragged it through some fine-grained stuff near the 
edges of the smaller craters; and, although the tires sunk in more, in that fluffy, less dense 
regolith, it still didn’t throw up an awful lot of dust.”4
 
 
Mitchell notes, “Dust didn’t adhere in any appreciable amount to the rolling surface of the tires. 
The MET seemed to mash it down, but it didn’t adhere. It didn’t throw out a rooster tail as we 
might have suspected.”4
 
Shepard adds, “Even at fairly good speeds.” 4
 
Mitchell agreed, “Yes, that was very surprising.” 4
 
The Apollo 14 Mission report says of the modular equipment transporter, “The smooth rubber 
tires threw no noticeable dust. No dust was noted on the wheel fenders or on top of the metal 
frame of the transporter.”  Later it adds, “The wheels did not kick up or stir up as much dust as 
expected before the flight. Very little dust accumulated on the modular equipment transporter.” 5
 
Irwin described being covered with dust in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, “I think this is the 
point at which I transferred the [Sample Return Container] SRC with the [Lunar Equipment 
Conveyor] LEC and got all dirty.” 6
 
Scott adds, “It seemed like they were still working pretty well. The connectors got covered with 
dust – one of mine. One of the primary problems was that LEC. On EVA-1, when I passed you the 
rock box on the LEC, I just got covered with dirt all down the front. The result was pretty dirty 
connectors.” 6
 
Scott re-iterated dust contamination problems caused by the LEC. “Well, I didn’t have any 
problem getting up and I could get to the first rung with a leap with any bag, with a good spring. 
And another problem I found with the LEC was when we transferred the ETB at the end of EVA-
1, the LEC line had been in the dirt and that’s the dirtiest I got, I think, in the whole trip. It just 
spread dust all up and down the front of me as the thing went up and I guess I could have 
grabbed that one handle and held it, but that would have been putting an awful lot of force on 
you and I think that the effort expended by the guy in the cabin to hold that stiff up is not worth it. 
I’d recommend just taking up the bags one by one manually, putting them on the porch.” 6
 
In the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief, Young notes, “We didn’t want any dust on the [Equipment 
Transfer Bag] ETB so we could keep the dust out of the cockpit. We had to adjust it on the later 
EVA.” 8
 
Lunar Roving Vehicle 
 
The Apollo 15 crew discussed dust contamination caused by the Lunar Roving Vehicle, (LRV). 
Scott says, “It went right up there without any trouble at all. When we got off the vehicle, we 
noted our boots sank in the soft soil a half an inch or so, maybe more. The Rover tracks just made 
a very slight surface disturbance.6
 
Irwin noted, “I’d estimate we sank (boots) in maybe 3 inches.” 6
 
Scott added, “It was really deep there, wasn’t it?  The wire wheels are excellent. They picked up 
very little dust. We did have an accumulation coming up under the fenders. I think the fenders are 
well designed and quite adequate. It seems to keep the dust off pretty well. You had a chance to 
see if there was a rooster tail behind the Rover when I drove. Did you see much?” 6
 
Irwin answered, “One time I did comment on the rooster tail. I guess it was on the Grand Prix.” 6
 
 
Scott asked, “How much was it?” 6
 
Irwin replied, “It kicked up, I’d estimate, 15 feet in the air. We had one over your head and it 
impacted in front of you.” 6
 
Scott queried, “Did it really?” 6
 
Irwin answered, “Yes.” 6
 
Scott observed, “I didn’t notice it looking forward.” 6
 
Irwin added, “It was really impressive. It’s too bad that sequence camera did not operate.” 6
 
Scott said, “I didn’t notice, when we were driving at the higher rates, any dust or dirt coming 
forward into our view.” 6
 
Irwin noted, “I think at that particular time, you were just doing a max acceleration, and that’s 
when it kicked up the rooster tail.” 6
 
Scott added, “Auto max acceleration. I don’t remember at any time feeling a particular wheel 
slippage. 6
 
“Dust generated by the wheels – we’d have to say was minimum. We did have to dust off the 
mirrors quite a bit, but it was far less than I expected to see. 6
 
“Yes. I don’t know whether all that dust was created by the wheels. It could have been the dust 
generated by us just getting on and off because we kicked a lot of dust, you know.6
 
“I really didn’t see much dust going forward from the wheels. I could see it hitting the fenders, 
and it seemed like the fenders did very well. I really didn’t see anything going forward. 6
 
“No. That’s why I had a difficult time accounting for the dust that was on the mirrors. 6
 
“Yes. Except it could have been very fine over a long period of time that we couldn’t see. The 
dust accumulation was minimum. It was a fine dust.” 6
 
Scott observed, “…just forward of the hand controller, was almost completely covered most of 
the time. If I used it, I had to brush it off.” 6
 
Apollo 15 Mission report stated, “Dust accumulation on the vehicle was considered minimal and 
only very small particulate matter accumulated over a long period of time. Larger particles 
appeared to be controlled very well by the fenders. The majority of the dust accumulation 
occurred on the lower horizontal surfaces such as floorboards, seatpans, and the rear wheel 
area. Soil accumulation within the wheels was not observed. Those particles which did pass 
through the wire seemed to come out cleanly. Dust posed no problem to visibility.” 7
 
The Apollo 16 crew discussed dust contamination after losing a fender on the LRV. Young said, 
“I think it was station 8 where we lost the rear fender and that was because I fell over it. I was 
coming out to help you and I tripped over the thing and it fell off. Avoid those fenders if you can. 
Every time that wheel came off the ground and went back in and dug in, it was like we were 
watching rain. Dirt came over it, covered up the battery cover, and the instrument panel so bad 
 
that you couldn’t read the POWER DOWN or POWER UP decals. When we got back to the lunar 
module, I brushed off not only the camera, but the batteries and the instrument panel as well. As 
that made the problem of dusting me and Charlie off even worse too. We had a lot of dust on top 
of our OPSs, had dust all over the place, dust on the helmet, dust around the neck ring, what a 
mess.”8
 
Duke added, “Raining dust. Yeah, the message is don’t trip over the fender. It didn’t bother us 
any apparently, but it sure was dusty.” 8
 
Young says, “Dust Generated by wheels:  We’ve got plenty of photography of what happens 
when you lose a fender. And the Grand Prix says what’s going on the rest of the time.” 8
 
Apollo 16 Mission report described the effects due to the loss of the fender, “The right fender 
was lost at station 8. Subsequently, the right rear wheel produced a shower of dust over the 
vehicle which appears in the 16-mm motion photography as falling snow. However, a great deal 
more dust was actually produced by the wheel than shows up in the film. The crew and the front 
of the vehicle, particularly the instrument panels, were covered with dust. The instrument panel 
and the start, stop, and closeout decals had ¼ inch of dust over them at the completion of the 
third extravehicular activity.” 9
 
The Apollo 17 crew also lost a fender on the rover during their mission. Schmitt said, “You’ve 
covered pretty well how the Rover performed on various kinds of terrain. Gene, why don’t you 
describe the fender. That was the major dust problem.”11
 
Cernan responded, “With the loss of one of the fender extensions, any one of them, the dust 
generated by the wheels without fenders or without fender extensions is intolerable. Not just the 
crew gets dusty, but everything mechanical on the Rover is subject to dust. Close to the end of the 
third EVA, all the mechanical devices on the gate and on the pallet in terms of bag holders and 
pallet locks and what have you were to the point that they would refuse to function mechanically 
even though the tolerances on these particular locks were very gross. They didn’t work because 
they were inhabited and infiltrated with this dust. Some could be forced over center. Others just 
refunded to operate even after dusting, cleaning, and a slight amount of pounding trying to break 
the dust loose.” 11
 
Apollo 17 Mission report commented on the lost fender, “The right fender was accidentally 
knocked off by catching it with a hammer handle. This resulted in breaking about 2-inches off of 
the inside rail on the permanent fender. The fender extension was replaced and taped into 
position; however, tape does not hold well when placed over dusty surfaces. The fender extension 
was lost after about an hour’s driving. Prior to the second extravehicular activity, a temporary 
fender was made from maps and taped and clamped into position, where it worked satisfactorily. 
Loss of the fender created concern that the dust problem would severely limit the crew’s 
operation and the capabilities of the rover systems, not only thermally, but mechanically.” 10
 
The report added, “During the first extravehicular activity at the lunar module site, the 
Commander inadvertently knocked off the right rear fender extension. While still at the lunar 
module site, the Commander taped the extension to the fender. Because of the dust surfaces, the 
tape did not adhere and the extension was lost. Lunar surface maps were clamped to the fender. 





Duke said, “The place where most of that dirt came from in the place you can’t clean was the 
strap-on pockets we had.”8
 
Young responded, “We got smart after EVA-1, and before we got in, we closed the flap. But the 
first time, I got in with that flap open, and my pocket caught on a hatch sill and when I came in 
with that right leg, the dust just flopped out.” 8
 
Duke added, “You had a pocketful – you had a contingency sample right in your pocket.”8
 
 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
As recorded in the Apollo 12 Mission Technical Debrief, the inability to bend at the waist while 
performing scientific objectives lead Bean to recommend modifications to reduce suit 
contamination. “You want to reach down, get down, and look at rocks, and you want to pick up 
things. You don’t always want to stop and use those tongs. I had the feeling that if we just had a 
strap mounted on our back, or to one side of our back or something, we could work as a team. 
One fellow could hold the other while he leans over and picks up or inspects a rock, or looks in a 
hole, or whatever he wants to do, and then lift him back up and he wouldn’t get dirty. We had 
talked earlier about just falling over on our faces and catching ourselves on our hands, or getting 
down on our knees, and inspecting whatever rocks we wanted to look at. When we got there, we 
could have done this physically, but the problem was, it was just so dirty that you didn’t want to 
do it. I went down on my hands a couple of times, but each time I did, I went down where I would 
land with my hands on a rock. I would stand there until I saw what I wanted to see, and then to a 
kind of push-up from the rock. But there isn’t always a rock around to do this sort of thing. If we 
just had some simple strap, worked as a team and got the big rocks fast, and looked at what you 
wanted real fast, I don’t think it would interfere with anything else you did.”3
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report described needed engineering considerations for wheels to mitigate 
dust contamination, “…certain constraints, such as the dust which would be set in motion by any 
wheels, must be considered in the design of such a vehicle. Also, under the light gravity, objects 
carried on such a conveyance would have to be positively restrained.”2
 
Alan Shepard, in the Apollo 14 Technical Debrief commented. “There is not much you can do 
with those cables except just try to stay clear of them. You might dig a trench and bury them if 
you thought it was worth the time, and it’s about the only thing I can think of. Bury them at least 
in the area of high activity right around the MESA.” 4
 
Mitchell continues, “Or mover them closer to the LM or out to the side so that they’re not right in 
your walking area. I think we can make a comment right here that cable-set on all the cables was 
a problem. Just about every cable we pulled out has some set in it that made it curl or kink, and it 
would not lie flat.” 4
 
Scott noted dust contamination problems with payload storage on the LRV, “Because of dust 
accumulation, I’d recommend those seat bags have a cover on them. Beta bags underneath the 
seat pan, some firmer cover, because my seat bag got full of dust. I’m glad we had the flaps 
stowed over the film mags and the 500-mm, otherwise we would have run into the same trouble 
as you did with your camera, with all that dust in there. Because almost every time I got under 
the seat pan, there was almost a solid layer of dust over it.” 6 
 
 
Young recommended in the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief, “Maybe an overflap that you Velcro on 
the other side of it to keep the dust out of there because I just don’t think you should have a 
problem donning and doffing. We really got a lot of dust and I don’t see really any way out of it 
when you’re picking up a bag on the Moon and you’re holding a bag and Charlie’s dumping dirt 
in there, the dust goes all over the place and it’s just as easy for it to go down your shirtsleeve as 
not. The fact is we had both dirt and rocks underneath the flap that you raise to get the glove 
open.” 8
 
Duke said in the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief, “Everyone of those cables had a memory. 
Everyone of them were off the ground. 8
 
“If I had to do it over again, I’d put all those cables up in the air so they would not get in the way 
of the crewmen. I sure didn’t think of it. I know that everybody said you had to step over the 
cables very carefully and I thought I was doing it, but I sure wasn’t.” 8
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report discussed concerns with dust contamination, “The dust was always 
a major cause of concern in that the crew never knew when dust might get into some equipment 
and compromise the lunar module or the extravehicular mobility unit environmental control 
systems. A program to improve housekeeping procedures must be actively pursued to reduce the 
amount of dust in the spacecraft as rapidly and as simply as possible. 9
 
“Because of the loss of the rear fender, both of the extravehicular mobility units, were covered 
with small dust clots. The only method discovered to satisfactorily remove the dust from the 
pressure suits was to beat the appendages of the suit against a surface area such as the lunar 
roving vehicle tool pallet, the lunar module landing gear struts, or the lunar module ladder. 
Dusting with the brush caused a coated layer of dust. Therefore, dusting with the dust brush 
should be the last resort in cleaning the suits.” 9
 
Apollo 17 Mission report commented, “The dust brush was probably one of the most often used 
pieces of equipment. It was employed on the rover thermal surfaces and reflectors, for cleaning 





Lunar dust transferred from equipment and spacesuits into the Lunar Module habitable volume 
caused cabin contamination. Due to the nature of the lunar environment, dust contamination will 
not be completely eliminated; however, thoughtful design can reduce the amount of dust 
accumulation on exposed equipment and spacesuits. 
 
Cleaning materials and suits reduced some dust contamination; however, the root cause of this 
problem was not resolved during the Apollo Program. Cleaning was accomplished by brushing 
and banging against hard surfaces prior to ingress and material transfers into the LM. These 
techniques removed dust to varying degrees particularly when crew hand fatigue after a long 




Inadequate mission and hardware design increased the amount of dust accumulation on 
equipment and suits. Improvements to consider for future lunar missions include: 
 
 Rover fender design and other mechanisms to reduce amount of raised dust 
 Equipment transfer and mobility aid design to eliminate parts that lie on the lunar surface 
 Space suit design that eliminates accumulated dust in pockets, crevices, etc. 
 Eliminate tripping hazards in high traffic areas 
 Spacesuit design that increases flexibility and visibility to reduce slips and falls 
 Contamination control strategy for transfer of crew and materials from the lunar 
environment into the habitable volume within the LSAM 
 Innovative cleaning and/or contamination control technologies and techniques for 




The Constellation Program should charter a Lunar Dust Working Group to integrate dust 
management activities. Membership should include customers, system and subsystem engineers, 
the astronaut office, operators, human factors specialists, flight surgeons, planetary geologists, 
and other subject matter experts and stakeholders as needed. This group should: 
 
 Research, document, and communicate Apollo lessons learned 
 Develop and recommend Lunar Dust Management Concept of Operations and 
Requirements 
 Provide recommendations for strategies and tools to design, test and optimize systems 
and operations to minimize dust accumulation 
 Prioritize and establish the Dust Management Technology Portfolio and associated 
schedule to ensure NASA funds are spent wisely 
 Maintain the Lunar Dust Website to encourage integration and communication 
 
An annual Lunar Dust Focus Group should identify and catalog promising dust management 
technologies to manage dust. Information collected should include technology descriptions, 
technology readiness levels, investment required to mature to TRL 6, time frame for maturation, 
and identify technology gaps. 
 
 
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT LUNAR DUST EFFECTS 
 
Summary 
During the Apollo Program experiments, cameras, watches, rovers, translation aids and sampling 




Apollo 12 experiments were affected by dust exposure. Electrostatic repulsion between the skirt 
on the Passive Seismic Experiment (PSE) and the ground led to dust contamination. However, the 
presence of dust did not significantly degrade any data returned). Dust entering the experiment 
caused a thermal short. A contrast chart dropped in the dust was rendered useless. Dust 
accumulation on thermal control surfaces resulted in high equipment temperatures. A sample 
container lost vacuum due to binding threads, possibly the result of lunar dust. 
 
During Apollo 14 Geophones were difficult to emplace. Because the upper 10-20 cm had very 
poor sheer strength a geophone tended to fall over. The signal strength was not affected. The 
geophone was re-emplaced and performed as expected. 
 
The Apollo 16 crew experienced thermal problems with the PSE due to dust contamination on 
thermal surfaces. The Heat Flow Experiment was ruined after a tripping incident. This failure 
may have been partially due to the Commander’s concern that lifting his feet too high around the 
central station results in kicking dust onto the PSE.  However, the root cause was that he could 
not see the cable because of the limitations associated with working the A7LB. Before the flight 
he recommended reinforcing the cable connections in the experiment; however these 
recommendations were not accepted. This was later corrected and was not a problem on Apollo 
17. The Cosmic Ray Detector experienced high temperatures when a film, in addition to dust, 
accumulated on thermal control surfaces. A locking device on the Radioisotope Thermoelectric 
Generator failed. 
 
During Apollo 17, Velcro failure led to dust contamination on a mirrored surface of the Surface 
Electrical Properties experiment. Dust permeation on various equipment bound moving parts. The 
Lunar Ejecta and Meteorites Experiment experienced high temperatures due to dust accumulation 





Pete Conrad stated in the Apollo 12 Technical Debrief, “We got back to the ALSEP and started a 
normal deployment. The first thing we noticed was that, as soon as we put the packages down on 
the surface, they began to accumulate dust.” 3
 
Alan Bean added, “The first experiment I put out was the passive seismic. It had two anomalies 
that I know. One was the skirt. The aluminum foil, the skirt, didn’t want to lie down. It wasn’t that 
it had a memory. When I placed it near the ground, the many layers seemed to separate. The skirt 
seemed to have some kind of static charge on it that would not allow it to touch the ground. It 
took quite a little pushing to get it to lie down on the ground. The only way I could make it lie flat 
was to put a little dirt on it, which I tried. But that wasn’t a good idea because it’s difficult to put 
little clods of dirt on it. I later got some Boyd bolts and made little alignment tubes to sit on it. 
That worked really well; it held down the skirt pretty well. The second anomaly was that the little 
 
dish that passive seismic sits in needs to have a solid bottom so when it is placed on the ground, 
there is not danger of dirt easing up through the center of it, as there was in the case of our dish, 
and touching the bottom of the passive seismic itself and causing a thermal short that would ruin 
it. We spent quite a bit of time tapping out a nice neat hole so this wouldn’t occur. Really, I think 
the fix should be to put a solid bottom to that dish…We left the area so that the exposed mirrored 
surface would be nice and clean and the two detectors would not get dust in them. I’m pretty sure 
that we did get some dust on the top of it. I hope it’s not enough to bother the operation…I think 
we are kidding ourselves if we think there is any way to deploy the experiment without getting a 
lot of dust and dirt on it. The pictures are going to show this. They just have to be designed to 
accept dirt and dust. If they can’t accept the dirt and dust, then they are going to have to be 
packaged in some way so that they can be deployed completely and then, the last act would be to 
pull some sort of pin and flip off the covering that would have all the dirt and dust on it, exposing 
the nice clean experiment.” 3
 
Conrad described solar wind spectrometer deployment.  
“The only one I deployed was the solar wind spectrometer and it went exactly as advertised. I 
checked the four legs down, took it out the proper distance, aligned it, and turned her loose. The 
Boyd bolts, as Al pointed out, were no problem; it would probably be easier if the cups were 
lower. The bolts should be kept covered with the tape though, because of the dust problem.” 3
 
Conrad explained dust problems with colored contrast charts.  
“One other item in the first EVA, the colored chart, I took out because I could not bend over, and 
there was not reasonable way to stick in the ground. I tried to work it into the ground so that it 
was perpendicular to the Sun. It didn’t work because of the soft dirt. It fell over and became 
covered with dust. I got back up and tried to brush it off, but it was impossible. I just made a 
complete shambles of it. The dust clung to it so badly that we didn’t get a color shot of that.” 3
 
Bean adds, “I want to discuss number 41 which is the contrast charts. We had three of them. One 
of them got dropped in the dirt and was completely covered with dust; so it was useless. There 
was no way to dust it off.” 3
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report added, “All shades on the contrast charts could be seen under the 
conditions tested. One of the charts was accidentally dropped to the surface and the dust coating 
rendered it unusable. The other two charts were used to look at the two extreme lighting 
conditions, up sun and down sun on the walls of a crater.” 2
 
Bean described Solar Wind Composition (SWC) Experiment Retrieval.  
“Finally it did tear about a 6-inch longitudinal rip; and I realized then that it just wasn’t flexible 
enough and didn’t want to roll up. So I let it go and let it sort of window-shade all the way 
around and then tried to roll it up by hand and not get my fingers on any of the foil. I’m sure I 
wasn’t able to do this entirely. I expect there is some dust from my gloves on the foil but I did the 
best I could.” 3
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report noted, “It was impossible to work with the various pieces of 
experiment equipment without getting them dusty. Dust got on all experiments during off-loading, 
transporting, and deployment, both as a result of the equipment physically touching the lunar 
surface and from dust particles scattered by the crewmen’s boots during the deployment 
operation.” 2
 
It also described high temperature problems.  
 
“Temperatures measured at five different locations in the instrument were approximately 68° F 
higher than expected because of lunar dust on the thermal control surfaces.” 2
The report described a sample container.  
“The environmental sample and the gas sample were easy to collect in the container provided, 
but there was a noticeable binding of the threads when replacing the screw-on cap. The binding 
could have been caused by a thermal problem, operation in a vacuum, or the threads being 
coated with lunar dust. Although the lid was screwed on as tightly as possible, the gas sample did 
not retain a good vacuum during the trip back to earth.” 2
 
Mitchell spoke of deploying seismometers in the Apollo 14 Technical Debrief.  
“Deploying the seismometers into the surface was a bit of a trick because of the softness of the 
soil. I had a little bit of difficulty getting them under my boot to push them in. Eventually, in all 
three cases, I ended up using the thumper plate itself. I would dangle them above the surface, pick 
up the thumper plate, and very carefully get the little stake started into the ground. Then I would 
step on it and push it in. However, the soil was sufficiently light and non-cohesive for the first few 
inches so that the seismometer had nothing that would hold it in place. This is the reason the 
second one pulled out. All you had to do was just touch it, and it either would tip over or pull out 
completely. When we finally got them in place, they were all within the 7-degree constraint. I’m 
sure they were. The second one was until it got pulled out; but, when it was eventually reset, it 
was all right also.” 4
 
The Apollo 14 Mission report says of the Superthermal Ion Detection experiment, “Despite a 
large amount of lunar dust which adhered to one end of the package when it fell over several 
times during the deployment the temperatures throughout the lunar day and night remained 
within the range allowed for the instrument.” 5
 
The report said of the Active Seismic Experiment Thumper anomaly, “Corrective action for 
Apollo 16 consists of adding a positive detent mechanism, properly aligned with the selector 
switch contact and dust protection for the firing switch actuator assembly.” 5
 
Irwin, in the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief stated, “One small comment as far as aligning the 
central station after it has been erected. It’s quite easy to do. I don’t know whether it was just the 
soft soil where we had the central station, or whether it was typical one-sixth g. Even though its 
erected, it’s easy to shift to line up the shadow device.” 8
 
In the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief, Young described tripping and breaking the Heat Flow 
Experiment.  
“A guy really can’t lift his feet too high around a central station, because when he does, he kicks 
dirt all over the PSE. It was a bad thing, but I still think it was incompatible with the kind of 
limitations that we are working with in the pressure suit. I tripped over the whole thing, but I 
didn’t even know I had done it. I was completely out as far as the active seismic experiment when 
I looked around and saw this cable following me…with that rock between the PSE and the central 
station walking on one side or the other of that rock would tend to get a little dirt on the skirt.” 8
 
Young continued, “Yes. And, because they keep falling over the rocks as I walked by it…It sure 
was a tragedy. If it had just moved the central station before it broke. I would have stopped right 
there and fixed it.” 8
 
Duke described dropping the RTG package into a crater.  
“I thought I’d blown it then because of those very fragile fins on the RTG. But, I looked at it and 
it hadn’t been damaged at all. In fact, it was hardly dusty.” 8
 
 
The crew discussed thermal problems with the PSE. Young said, “They said they were having 
thermal problems with the PSE.” 8
 
Duke replied, “Already! That’s because there’s dust on them.” 8
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report described overheating.  
“The passive seismic experiment was deployed as planned. All elements of the experiment have 
functioned normally with the exception of the thermal control system. Two days after activation, 
the temperature increased markedly beyond the controller set point and eventually exceeded the 
range of the sensor, 61.4° C. The temperature stabilized at night to 52.2° C. Photographs of the 
instrument show the shroud skirt to be raised at several places (fig, 4-5); further, dust was 
inadvertently kicked onto the skirt after the photographs were taken. These factors are believed to 
be responsible for the abnormal temperatures. The temperatures are not expected to affect 
instrument life or seismic data, but will degrade the tidal data.” 9
 
The report explains degradation of the Cosmic Ray Detector, “The plastic in all panels of the 
experiment was degraded by heating above the design limit of 54° C, which temperature 
degradation begins. The high temperature was most likely caused by a film accumulating on the 
thermal control surface, in addition to lunar dust.” 9
 
The report stated, “The solar wind composition experiment for this mission differed from those of 
previous missions in that pieces of platinum foil were attached to the specially prepared 
aluminum foil used to entrap noble gas particles. This was done to determine whether or not the 
platinum foil pieces could be cleaned with flouridic acid to remove lunar-dust contamination 
without destroying rare gas isotopes of solar wind origin up to the mass of krypton.” 9
 
The Apollo 17 Mission report discussed the gravimeter.  
“The gimbal was observed to be free swinging after the initial release and after all subsequent 
jarrings and shakings. A small amount of dust fell off the universal handling tool into the gimbal 
housing during the final jarring of the gimbal, but all final alignments and leveling by the crew 
were normal.” 10
 
The report commented on the Lunar Mass Spectrometer. 
“The deployment of the lunar mass spectrometer was as planned. A small amount of dust 
(approximately 0.1-mm thick) covered about 30 percent of the north-facing surface of the 
experiment.” 10
 
The report discussed the Surface Electrical Properties Experiment. 
“Velcro pile pad was bonded to the Kapton bag and the Velcro hook strap was bonded to the 
Kapton flaps. The bond of the Velcro pads for moth flaps had already failed before the Lunar 
Module Pilot configured the receiver at the end of the first extravehicular activity, thus resulting 
in dust accumulation on the mirror surface under both flaps. The bond of the Velcro pads to the 
Kapton failed, leaving no trace of the adhesive on the Kapton, and the pads remained attached to 
the straps. The polyurethane PR-127 A and B bonding material used was acceptable and 
recommended for bonding Velcro to Kapton. The failure most likely resulted from a weak bond 
caused by improper bonding preparation or procedure. The mixing and timing of the bonding 
application and mating are critical, as well as maintaining the surface free of contamination.” 10
 
The report described condition of the cosmic ray detector. 
 
“Microscopic examination of the detector surfaces showed very little dust. The maximum 
temperature of approximately 400° K was well below the critical limit.” 10
 
The report noted difficulty moving mechanical parts.  
“At the end of the second extravehicular activity, the Lunar Module Pilot returned to the lunar 
surface experiment deployment site for additional verification on the deployment of the lunar 
surface gravimeter. The second extravehicular activity duration was 7 hours and 37 minutes 
during which time the lunar roving vehicle traveled approximately 20.4 kilometers. A total of 60 
samples were collected with an accumulated weight of approximately 75 pounds. At the end of the 
extravehicular activity, all hardware systems were operating as expected, except for a noticeable 
difficulty in the movement of some mechanical parts because of dust permeation.” 10
 
The report continued, “The geopallet was used as planned for the first two extravehicular 
activities. By the start of the third extravehicular activity, most of the moving parts of that pallet 
had begun to bind because of dust permeation along interfacing surfaces.” 10
 
The report discussed successful gravimeter deployment. 
“The gimbal was observed to be free swinging after the initial release and after all subsequent 
jarrings and shakings. A small amount of dust fell off the universal handling tool into the gimbal 
housing during the final jarring of the gimbal, but all final alignments and leveling by the crew 
were normal.” 10
 
The report mentioned dust on the Lunar Mass Spectrometer. 
“The deployment of the lunar mass spectrometer was as planned. A small amount of dust 
(approximately 0.1-mm thick) covered about 30 percent of the north-facing surface of the 
experiment.” 10
 
The report explained effects of dust on the mirror surface of the Surface Electrical Properties 
experiment receiver. 
“A dust film of about 10 percent on the mirror surface could result in the indicated degradation 
of thermal control and a film of this amount may not be apparent to the crew.” 10
 
The report described overheating in the Lunar Ejecta and Meteorites Experiment. 
“It is postulated that when the experiment is on, the charge differential observed at these times 
may result in an accretion of lunar dust on the east and west sensors. Based on this, the 
experiment was turned off each sunset and sunrise after the second lunar day. The presence of 
dust on the sensor film and grid would degrade the thermal control system and result in higher 
experiment temperatures during the lunar day.” 10
 
Schmitt said, “You’ve heard all about the ALSEPs and the LTG problem in real time. It’s on the 
transcript. It was something in the dome removal strip. We pried it off with a hammer. The 
ALSEP traverse surprised me in that the package seemed heavier than I expected.” 11
 
Cernan added, “You lost a block.” 11
 
Schmitt responded, “I lost a block. It just came off the Velcro. I may have hit it with my leg. 
Really the dust was so deep and soft that the blocks were relatively ineffective, and I ended up 
putting a rock underneath one corner.” 11
 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
 
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report recommended, “Because there does not appear to be a simple 
means of alleviating this dust condition, it should become a design condition. Although both 
experiment and package tools worked well, the deployment could have been more efficient if the 
tools had been from 2 to 5 inches longer. The difficulty in fitting and locking both tools in most of 
the experiment receptacles was frustrating and time consuming. Looser tolerances would 
probably eliminate the problem.” 2
 
Irwin observed in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, “Might make a comment here that the dust 
covers that were put on the various experiments, really paid off because we were in probably the 
worst situation that I’ve seen as far as dust and soil, but they kept all the Boyd bolts clear of any 
dust.” 6
 
Schmitt, in the Apollo 17 Technical Debrief observed, “I’m sure we’ll get into this in the system 
experiments, but as a general comment for any radiator surfaces that need to be protected, you 
need to have more than just a cursory design on the protection of those radiators. The SEP is the 
case in point, and that was a completely inadequate design to protect those radiators. If we ever 
do it again in a dust environment, you must have clear and very tight protection of your mirrors 




Apollo 12 documents described dust-covered lenses. The crew of Apollo 15 experienced failure 
due to dust in drive mechanisms and difficult to release film magazines from cameras. They 
reported lenses covered with dust and were unable to install the polarizing filter due to dust in the 
bayonet fitting. Dust on television cameras caused a halo effect and created glints due to sun light 




The Apollo 12 Mission report spoke of problems with cameras.  
“The exterior of both cameras became extremely dusty on the lunar surface. It is believed that 
some dirt was on the lens, although this condition was difficult to detect because the lenses were 
recessed. Cleaning the lens was not possible but would have been desirable. Toward the end of 
the second extravehicular period, the fluted thumbwheel on the screw that attaches the camera to 
the camera mounting, which then attaches to the front of the suit, worked free from the screw. The 
camera could no longer be mounted to the bracket or the suit and was therefore not used for the 
remainder of the extravehicular phase.” 2
 
Bean described problems with cameras. 
 “I would like to say something about the camera. We got a lot of dust on ourselves and also on 
the outside of the camera. We kept looking at the lens to see if there was any dust on it and to see 
if it was going to degrade the pictures. Neither Pete nor I could see it on each other’s camera, 
although the other parts of our camera were covered with dust. We’ll have to take a look at the 
pictures that we returned. If it does turn out to be a problem, we’re going to have to come up with 
some sort of brush we can use to dust off the lens, because I don’t see any other way. We were 
trying our best to keep the equipment clean; but just moving around, trenching, leaning over, and 
all the other things tend to get dust on the equipment.” 3
 
In the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, Scott spoke of dust in the drive mechanism, “—and I guess 
the problem with the camera, we brought it back for the people to look at – I think the problem is 
 
definitely dirt in the drive mechanism. I fiddled with it that night and got it going. The next day, it 
hung up again. After we got into orbit, we worked on it some more, and you could see that the 
wheel exposed by the Reseau place was hanging up. If you put your fingernail in there and 
triggered it, it would get going. I think with the amount of dirt that you have, and the fact that the 
camera is level with the area in which work when you roll up the bags, you get dirt, in the 
camera.” 6
 
Irwin continued, “Dust accumulation also gave a problem as far as removing the film mags from 
the camera. There were several times where it was very difficult to release it.” 6
 
Scott said, “I think the camera would be better off if we’d protect it a little better. We used the 
lens brushes on the cameras, and they were very good.” 6
 
Irwin added, “On the TV also.” 6
 
Scott agreed, “On the TV also. That lens brush is really a good brush. It cleaned it off very well. 
The dust brush, to clean off the suits seemed to work pretty good. It got the gross dirt off. It didn’t 
get everything, I guess it also worked quite well on the LRV and the LCRU mirrors – cleaned 
them off pretty well.” 6
 
The Apollo 15 Mission report said, “Lunar dust on the television camera lens caused a halo 
effect and sun reflected glints. Improvement in picture quality was restored periodically after the 
crew brushed the lens.” 7
 
The report stated that the polarizing filter could not be installed. “The polarizing filter for the 
Hasselblad electric data camera could not be installed because of excessive dust in the bayonet 
fitting.” 7
 
On the subject of Azimuth adjustment, the report suggested the problems were caused by grease 
rather than dust, “To adjust the azimuth to the proper dial reading, the camera is rotated on a 
12.5 inch-diameter ball-bearing ring. The bearing is not sealed; however, the crew did not 
observe any lunar dust on the bearing. 7
 
“The azimuth ring bearing was packed with a waxy, low-outgassing grease which stiffens 
appreciably at temperatures below 50° F. This grease is normally used as a sealant rather than a 
lubricant. The camera was intentionally kept in the shade to protect the film from high 
temperatures. As a result, the grease stiffened. The manual azimuth adjustment operation was not 
included in cold chamber tests with other operations of the camera.” 7
 
Recommendations and Lesson Learned 
 
Bean recommended brushes for cleaning dust off cameras. “The thing that worried me most 
about the cameras was that we were getting a lot of dust on them. I was afraid we were getting 
dust on the lens, and we had no means whatsoever to clean it off. I think it would be definitely 
desirable to have a whiskbroom on the MESA. We could use the whiskbroom to dust off the suits, 
and perhaps the back of the broom could have something so that you could use to dust off the lens 
of the camera. I suspect that as missions get longer, we’re going to get some pretty good dust 
covering on the lens of the cameras. Such a dust covering is going to degrade the photographs 
unless we have some means of cleaning the camera lens off, which we did not have in this case”. 3
 
 
Scott recommended, “I think we ought to put some little Beta booties over the top of the camera 
to keep it clean, at least over the joint there where the film mag goes on. They were getting so 
dirty that every time we reset our f-stop and lens, I had to brush mine off, because I couldn’t see 
the settings on the camera, it got so dirty. I’d recommend maybe Velcro tabs and a little piece of 






The Apollo 12 Mission report described lock buttons on the LEC, “The metal pin that retains the 
lunar module end of the conveyor was not large enough to prevent it from slipping out of the 
yoke. By the end of the second extravehicular period, the lock buttons on the two hooks were 
extremely difficult to operate because of accumulated dust. This locking feature is not 
necessary.” 2
 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report stated, “The lunar equipment conveyor was redesigned to a single 




Watches failed on both Apollo 14 and 16 missions. Although the root causes were not dust 
related, they may have provided a mechanism for dust contamination that resulted in failure. 
 
Observations 
Mitchell described his watch malfunction. “I think that my Omega might have gotten some dirt or 
something in it because it would not run when it wound down very much,  I had to keep it wound 
up at all times, and so I was winding it three or four times a day. It stopped on one occasion when 
I don’t think it should have.” 4
 
Duke continues, “Another comment on the EVA. We mentioned out failures, except I failed to 
mention that my watch blew a crystal on EVA-3 and it stopped running at that point. So the flight 
watch went belly up and I got it brought back to let them examine it. But the crystal either blew 
out or broke, and I don’t ever remember hitting it. The face of the watch doesn’t look like it’s 
scratched. So I think what happened is the crystal just blew out and we got dust in it, and the 
thing was just not running and that happened on EVA-3.” 8
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report stated, “At depressurization, just prior to the third lunar 
extravehicular activity, the Lunar Module Pilot noted that his chronograph crystal was gone. The 
chronograph hands and face were not hit. However, about 12 minutes later the movement 
stopped. Most likely, warpage caused by thermal cycling allowed the differential pressure across 
the acrylic crystal to pop it out of the case. The exposure to and penetration of lunar dust 
contamination about the Lunar Module Pilot’s sleeves probably caused the failure of the 
chronograph movement.” 9
 
RadioIsotopic Thermal Generator 
 
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report explained the failure of a locking collar on the RTG, “Subpackage 
2 was laid flat on the surface so that the radioisotope thermoelectric generator could be serviced. 
The subpackage was then reoriented in order to provide the Lunar Module Pilot a clear access 
path to the radioisotope thermoelectric generator housing. The reorientation may have forced 
dust into the locking collar which, later could have prevented the Lunar Module Pilot from 
making a positive lock-on to the carrying bar.” 9  Note:  Duke earlier  reported dropping the RTG 
into a crater. 
 
Lunar Rover Vehicle (LRV) 
 
LRVs and associated equipment experienced anomalies during the Apollo Program. During 
Apollo 15 and 16 mission batteries overheated. Apollo 16 and 17 LRV fenders broke off (as 
discussed in Section 6). The Apollo 17 crew found displays and checklists unreadable; they 
increased the amount of time cleaning dust from the rover; and commented on deteriorating 
Velcro due to dust contamination. 
    
Observations 
 
Scott, in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, thought that connectors and controls worked well. 
“Connectors and controls, I thought, all worked very well. I think it was a good idea that they put 
that plastic plate over the flags in the[Remote Control Unit]  RCU, because that sure got dirty.” 6
 
Irwin said, “I guess we commented about the general dust condition on the Rover after the EVA.”  
(See the Section 6 for more detail). 6
 
Apollo 15 Mission report discussed battery overheating. “At the beginning of the second 
extravehicular activity, the battery 1 cover had closed automatically, as expected. Battery 2 
apparently had not cooled down enough and the cover was still open. It was closed manually 
powering up the vehicle. When the vehicle was activated, battery-1 temperature was 68 degrees F 
and battery-2 temperature was 78 degrees F. The difference was probably caused by the 
difference in dust accumulation on the thermal mirrors. These temperatures are consistent with 
predicted cool-down rates with the covers open and warm-up rates with the covers closed. 
During the second traverse, the battery-1 and battery-2 temperatures increased to 92 F and 98 F, 
respectively. The battery covers were opened at the conclusion of the second extravehicular 
activity period.” 7
 
The report continued, “At the beginning of the third extravehicular activity, both covers were 
open. Little battery cool-down had occurred, probably because of further dust accumulation on 
both battery mirrors, although the battery covers had been closed for the traverses. The covers 
must not have been closed tight enough against the Velcro edges to keep dust off the mirror 
surfaces. Only a small amount of dust on the surface will preclude the desired cool-down. At the 
conclusion of the traverse, battery-1 and battery- 2 temperatures had increased to 108 F and 113 
F, respectively, which is an acceptable level.” 7
 
Young, in the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief expressed concerns about design of the battery covers. 
“There’s plenty of dust on the radiators just coming from opening the battery covers. It’s very 
difficult for me to reach across there to close the battery covers. I would think that the next time 
anybody designs a vehicle, they’d put the opening and closing mechanism on the outboard side, 
instead of on the inboard side of the radiator. I was always afraid that I was going to end up 
falling right in the middle of the batteries.”8
 
 
Young, in the Apollo 16 Mission Debrief expressed concerns with the LRV battery covers, 
“When we were opening the battery covers, of course, we had to dust the [Lunar 
Communications Relay Unit] LCRU (they got dusty all the time), the LCRU did badly when they 
opened the battery covers. We had to park the LRV such that it was rolled into the Sun a little. 
That may have given them a thermal problem they didn’t know about. We parked it at the right 
heading, but when we opened that battery covers the dirt just flew up in the air and came right 
back down on the batteries. We had to dust the batteries. I could see why they got dusty. There’s 
hardly any way to avoid it. That was on the dust EVA before we lost any fenders. We were 
relatively free of dust in the front of the vehicle other than what we accumulated on the front of it 
as we drove.” 8
 
Duke remembered problems resulting from the broken fender, “The RCU got dusty due to our 
dust fender problem. I had a tough time reading mine even though it had the plastic over it. They 
really did a good job putting that plastic over the top of that thing or we never would have been 
able to read it.” 8
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report described the effect of open battery covers, “At the conclusion of 
the first extravehicular activity, the vehicle was parked with the front of the vehicle pointing 
towards the north. The battery temperatures were 104° F and 105° F with 108 and 105 ampere-
hours remaining. The battery covers were brushed and opened, the radiator surfaces were 
dusted, and the power-down was completed. The battery covers did not close between the first 
and second extravehicular activities and temperatures at power-up for the second extravehicular 
activity were 70° F and 82° F.” 9
 
The report continued, “The crew noted that the forward wheels tended to dig in when attempting 
to climb slopes without rear-wheel power. The right rear fender extension was knocked off and, 
thereafter, dust was thrown up from the right rear wheel and covered the crew, the console, and 
the communications equipment. Midway through the second extravehicular traverse, the ampere-
hour integrator for battery 1 began indicating about four time the normal battery usage. Because 
of the higher-than-desired temperatures on battery 1, a series of procedures were initiated to 
lower the load. These procedures probably caused the inadvertent removal of drive power from a 
pair of wheels, thereby losing two odometer inputs and the associated static range, bearing, and 
distance displays. The problem cleared when the normal switch and circuit breaker configuration 
was restored.” 9
 
The report explained a battery temperature caution and warning flag. “The battery covers were 
opened at the completion of each extravehicular activity. Opening the battery covers threw dust 
onto the battery mirror surfaces; therefore the mirrors were completely brushed after each 
extravehicular activity and were brushed twice at final rover parking after completing the third 
extravehicular activity. Even though the mirror surfaces were brushed as well as possible, battery 
2 temperature caused the actuation of a caution and warning flag while driving to station 
11/12.” 9
 
Cernan said in the Apollo 17 Technical Debrief, “Crew restrictions, Limitations, and Capabilities 
– Displays – I could see and read all displays all the time except when we got dust on the 
checklist down in front of the hand controller. Then that became effectively unreadable until I 
could get off the Rover at the next stop and dust it.” 11
 
Cernan suggested, “They should be sealed or protected. We had absolutely no dust problem with 
the wheels, and those are sealed units. Dust accumulated on the radiator.”11
 
 
Schmitt added, “That goes for tools too. The only tools we had locks on were the scoop and the 
rake, and those were getting stiff and wouldn’t lock. They wouldn’t relock once you adjusted 
them.” 11
 
Cernan spoke of dust contamination. “The period of time when we had lost the rear fender just 
put a solid coat of gray dust over everything. Once we got the fender repaired, the dust problem 
was at a minimum. After the long traverse rides, the radiators all required a good amount of 
dusting. That required X amount of time. That’s going to be required again any time we have a 
lunar surface operation.” 11
 
Cernan added comments about problems with Velcro, “Something else that dust penetrates that I 
don’t think has been mentioned before is that it penetrates and deteriorates the capability of 
Velcro. I could see it on the [Lunar Communication Relay Unit] LCRU covers and the SEP 
covers. The Velcro pulled off to keep the SEP covers closed, but the Velcro that kept them open 
didn’t pull off but it was deteriorating. If you want to use tape on the lunar surface after what 
you’re taping has been exposed to the dust, you first have to clean that surface off with a piece of 
tape or something and get the mirror dusted off before the tape will even begin to adhere to the 
surface you are applying it to.” 11
 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
 
Bean suggested appropriate wheel design for a lunar rover in the Apollo 12 Technical Debrief, “It 
wasn’t very difficult, I don’t think to operate on that slope, Pete. It wasn’t particularly slippery…I 
know that they are trying some sort of wheel vehicle for the next flight. My impression was that 
you could use a wheel vehicle but you probably should have one with wide tires. Although the 
dust was only an inch deep or something like that, if you had some skinny tires it might give you a 
problem. I don’t know how big the diameter they ought to be, but they ought to be fat things to 
help it ride along the surface.” 3
 
Schmitt recommended dust protection for mechanical equipment, “What we’re really saying is 
that in any future operation, mechanical joints or levers and this sort of thing are going to have 
to be protected.” 11
 
The Apollo 17 Mission report spoke of cleaning batteries, “The batteries were not dusted until 
well into the second extravehicular activity; however, after that time, the battery covers were 
brushed clean at every stop. The cleanliness of the batteries is attributed to the fact that the 
covers were continually dusted and kept clean. Dusting was time-consuming, but it was no 
greater problem than anticipated preflight, and it was part of the overhead in system 
management that leads to successful vehicle operation.” 10
 
Lunar Materials Sampling and Samples 
 
This section contains information on mechanical problems caused by lunar dust and information 
that provides insight into regolith and the associated effectiveness of regolith sampling methods. 
The emphasis is on mechanical problems. However, the additional information is included to 
provide future hardware and mission designers information to help in evaluating various designs. 
 
The Apollo 12 crew experienced slight binding of the locking collar for the shovel or core tube 
due to dust collection in the mechanism. The sample return container lid did not maintain vacuum 
because the lid was coated with dust. During Apollo 16 a bag of rocks fell off the tool harness 
 
because the Velcro was clogged with dust and failed. The Apollo 17 crew was unable to use the 





Bean described sampling, “The entire lunar surface was covered with this mantle of broken-up 
material, fine dust of varying depth. As a result, everything looked pretty much the same – sides 
of the craters, tops of the craters, flat lands, and ejecta blanket. If you’re going to any geology, 
you’re going to have to dig through this mantle of brown or black and to look beneath the surface 
a little bit. We had a shovel that we used for trenching, but because of the length of the extension 
handle and the inability to lean over and what have you, we never could trench more that about 8 
inches. That was about the best we could do, and that was a pretty big effort.” 3  
 
The Apollo 12 report said, “The extension handle was also from 3 to 5 inches too short for 
optimum use with the shovel. The upper collar that mates with the aseptic sampler is no longer 
required and could be removed. The locking collar for the shovel or core tube was binding 
slightly by the end of the second excursion, probably because of dust collection in the mechanism. 
The shovel was used to dig trenches, as well as to collect soil samples. With the present extension 
handle for the shovel, it was only possible to dig trenches about 8 inches in depth. Trenching 
operations were very time consuming.” 2
 
 The report said, “Closing of the sample return containers was not difficult and was similar to 
that experienced during 1/6g simulations in an airplane. The seal for the sample return container 
lid became coated with considerable dist when the documented samples were being loaded into 
the container. Although the surface was then cleaned with a brush, the container did not maintain 
a good vacuum during the return to earth.” 2
 
Mitchell asked Shepard to remark on core sampling, “Would you remark about your experience 
with the core tube where you drilled at point A, so we can contrast it with my experience later at 
Triplet?” 4
 
Shepard responded, “Point A is where I took the double core. It went down all the way. It went 
down relatively easy for the first section. The next half of the second core wasn’t bad, requiring 
just general tapping; then I had to bang it very hard to get the last half of the top core, but I did 
get it.” 4
 
Mitchell asks, “Did you get it in all right?” 4
 
Shepard answers, “1-3/4 to 1-7/8. I guess it was two cores. That’s about the deepest penetration 
we had…You were making an attempt to do a triple core. It looked as if Ed and I should have 
changed positions because it was not soft enough for him and it was too soft for me. We practiced 
digging the trench in the edge of the crater, because it was mechanically and physically easier to 
dig the trench on the side of the crater. By the side of the crater, the dust just wasn’t cohesive 
enough to get a good sample of soil mechanics. We probably did get a pretty good idea of what 
the composition of the soil was, because it wouldn’t hold more that a 60-degree angle on the side 
of the trench before it all started falling back down in…We felt that we had less dust throughout 
our area perhaps than the previous landing sites.” 4
 
Scott in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief stated, “I thought the lock box worked just fine. I guess 
we can’t think of any improvements on that.” 6
 
Scott says, “The next order of business was drilling the stems for the deep core. As I started out 
the soil was very soft, and the drill went very easily and too fast down to the bed rock. The 
ground gave a call for the rates, which I had forgotten in my haste to finish up the drill. We were 
 
supposed to go an inch per second. I got about a stem and a half in before the ground reminded 
me of the rate, and I slowed down to an inch per second. I hit bed rock, or the very hard soil, 
which was a step-jump in hardness as I drilled.” 6
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report says, “The sample collection bag attachment to the tool harness 
was unsatisfactory. On one occasion, one half-full bag of rocks fell off the tool harness and, 
fortunately, lodged between the rear fender and the frame of the lunar roving vehicle. Because 
the Velcro is subject to clogging with dust, the manner in which it is used to attach the bags to the 
portable life support system tool harness will not assure positive retention of the sample 
collection bags on the portable life support system tool harness. 9
 
“The Velcro strap, when tightened down, keeps the bag from floating or bouncing off the hooks. 
During the lunar roving vehicle operations, the Velcro strap sometimes loosened because of the 
entrapped lunar dust so that the bag could come off. 9
 
Apollo 17 Mission report, “The lunar surface scoop was the primary sampling tool used by the 
Lunar Module Pilot and it worked well. However, by the beginning of the third extravehicular 
activity, dust in the scoop-locking mechanism prevented extensive use in any of the multiple 
detents. Only the 45-degree position was used during most of the third traverse.” 10
 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
 
Bean recommended, “If we’re going to do any good geology, it’s going to take a lot of trenching 
to get down below the surface. I’d like to recommend that we get a better trenching tool. Maybe 
all we need to do is lengthen the extension handle about 6 inches; but if we’re going to look and 
see what’s beneath the surface, we’re going to have to dig it out of there somehow. I also 
recommend that we get a lot more core tubes aboard the next flight. I felt that, on the surface 
everything was pretty much the same and the real secrets were hiding about 2 to 8 inches under 
the surface. We really need to scrape away the upper surface or core down through it.” 3
 
The Apollo 12 Mission report recommended, “Because of the continuous mantle of dust that 
coats most of the lunar surface, trenching should be deeper and more frequent on future mission. 
A specific trenching tool should be used.” 2
 
The Apollo 16 Mission report noted, “For Apollo 17, the sample container bag hooks that are 
attached to the portable life support system tool carrier have been redesigned to prevent the bag 
from floating or bouncing off the portable life support system. The new hook design consists of a 
flat spring and a stop so that the same force is required to install and remove the bag.” 9
 
Apollo 17 Mission report described modifications to lunar sample return containers, “A triple 
seal arrangement maintained a vacuum during trans-lunar and transearth flight. Seal protectors 
were also provided to prevent lunar dust from getting on the seals. The strap-latch system 
consisted of four straps and two cam latches. When closing the container, the crewman engaged 




Dust raised by crews and equipment covered everything that was used on the lunar surface. In 
order to manage the risks to mission success created by lunar dust, everything that comes into 
contact with the lunar surface must be designed for reliability in the dusty environment. 
 
 
Cleaning techniques were used with varying effectiveness. These techniques, promising new 
technologies and operational procedures should be evaluated and developed to manage risk.  
 
During Apollo cleaning operations were very time consuming and labor intensive. Future lunar 
exploration missions should reduce the amount of time required for these activities. In addition, 
operational timelines should accommodate the need for cleaning as defined by dust management 
systems design and operational concepts. 
 
Future Work 
Future work recommended for Surface Equipment is the same as Section 6. Each topic in this 
section should also consider reliability of surface equipment and work efficiency index. 
 
 
SPACE SUITS AND SEALS 
 
Summary 
Space suit anomalies caused by lunar dust created problems for the Apollo program. During 
Apollo 12 wrist and suit hose locks became difficult to operate, suit fabric was abraded and leak 
rates increased. The Apollo 14 crew reported helmet visor scratches that decreased visibility. The 
Apollo 15 crew was hampered by difficulty in connecting and disconnecting PLSS PGA 
connection and disconnection. During Apollo 16 lunar operations, dust in zippers led to difficult 
operation; wrist ring pull connectors were covered with dust, degrading mobility; PLSS RCU 
displays were abraded and could not be read; and dust in helmet visor mechanisms resulted in 
over visors that would not retract. The Apollo 17 crew reported stiff glove connectors, stickiness 
in helmet visor retraction, and reduced visibility due to scratches and dust accumulation on visors. 
 
Observations 
Conrad described concerns with the effects of dust on space suits in the Apollo 12 Technical 
Debrief. “I got quite concerned with not only the wear and tear on the suits but the effect of the 
dust on the suits. On our final hookup back on the LM ECS system for ascent it was all we could 
do to get our wrist locks and suit hose locks to work. They obviously were beginning to bog down 
with dust in them. When you go over these suits later, you’ll be able to analyze this. I have no 
idea what the effects were on the O-rings. Suit integrities did stay good, but there’s no doubt in 
my mind that with a couple more EVA’s something would have ground to a halt. In the area 
where the lunar boots fitted on the suits, we wore through the outer garment and were beginning 
to wear through the Mylar. I’m sure they will be very carefully inspected to see what these effects 
were. Al and I had extreme confidence in the suits; therefore, we didn’t give a second thought to 
working our heads off in the suits and banging them around – not in an unsafe manner but to do 
the job in the way we had practiced it on Earth. These suits were more worn than our training 
suits. We must have had more than a hundred hours suited work with the same equipment, and 
the wear was not as bad on the training suits as it is on these flight suits in just the 8 hours that 
we were out. I think it has to be the abrasiveness of the dust.”3
 
Bean adds, “If we had had the suits opened up, I’m afraid that we would have had a lot more 
trouble with dust in the zippers, inside the suit, and inside the helmets. It was tough enough just 
on the wrist rings and neck rings. We tried to wipe them off before we put our equipment back on 
the next morning but we did notice it harder to put on. I didn’t have any other leak rate for all the 
pressure checks prior to launch and at other times, but during the last pressure check that we 
pulled I had a leak rate of something like two tenths over the minute. So, the thing was leaking 
somewhere and it must have been around the neck and wrist rings because those were the only 
openings that had changed.” 3
 
Conrad agreed, “My suit was the same way. I had about 0.15 over a minute although I had very 
little on our first check prior to getting out.” 3
 
Apollo 12 Mission report says, “During the last hookup of the suits to the electronic control 
assembly prior to ascent, the lunar dust on the wrist locks and suit hose locks caused difficulty in 
completing these connections. In addition, much dust was carried into the lunar module after the 
extravehicular periods. Dust may have contaminated certain suit fittings, since during the last 
suit pressure decay check, both crewmen reported a higher-than-normal suit-pressure decay. 
However, no significant difference in oxygen consumption between the two extravehicular 
periods was apparent. 2
 
 
“Considerable dirt had adhered to the boots and gloves and to the lower portion of the suits. 
There were fillets of dirt around the interior angles of the oxygen hose connectors on the suit. The 
suit material just beneath the top of the lunar boots chafed sufficiently to wear through the outer 
suit layer in several spots. The dust and dirt resulted in a very pronounced increase in the 
operating force necessary to open and close the wrist rings and the oxygen hose connectors. The 
Commander’s suit had no leakage, either prior to launch or prior to the first extravehicular 
activity. Just before his second egress, the leak rate was 0,15 psi/min and, prior to cabin 
depressurization for equipment jettison, was 0.25 psi/min. If the suit zippers had been operated 
for any reason, the suit leakage might have exceeded the 0.30 psi/min limit of the integrity check. 
2
 
“The pressure suits operated well throughout the extended use period. The outer protective layer 
was worn through in the areas where the boots interface with the suit. The Kapton insulation 
material just below the outer layer also showed wear in these areas. In addition, a minute hole 
was worn in one of the boot bladders of the Commander’s suit. Suit performance was not 




Mitchell in the Apollo 14 Technical Debrief stated, “I have the comment that although my suit 
did exceptionally well, far better than the training suit ever did, it was still stiffer and took more 
effort to just hustle around than the training suit did, which was well broken in. I encountered a 
little bit of a problem with bending over, which I had not encountered in one-g, and I think this is 
in proportion to the forces between the one-sixth g and the stiffness of the suit as compared with 
the well-worked-in suit in one-g. I found that I could not bend down to the MET level. I could not 
just bring my body forward like I could in the training suit and get down to the MET. I had to 
bend my knees or get down on a knee to reach things low on the MET such as the weigh bags 
down on the side, or the camera retaining clips on the MET. It was more difficult for me to bend 
down for them.” 4
 
Shepard responded, “I don’t know whether it was unique to Ed’s suit or not, because I didn’t 
have that problem.” 4
 
Shepard said, “We did clean and lubricate the PGA seals at the neckrings and the wristrings. I 
think it was a good way to go. We didn’t get an awful lot of dirt, but we did get just enough  of a 
smudge on the wiping cloth to indicate there was a trace of dust there, so I think that’s a good 
way to go. It doesn’t take too much time and I recommend doing that.” 4
 
 
Mitchell agreed, “Yes. I think it’s interesting – I don’t know whether that had anything to do with 
it or not – but my EMU leak rate was less on the second EVA than on the first. That is completely 
inexplicable to me. The only thing that was different was that we lubricated the rings. Whether 
that has anything to do with it or not, I don’t know. As I recall, I had only 0.15 leak rate on the 
second EVA – I mean on the pressure check for the second EVA. My leak rate was much closer to 
specification during the second EVA than during the first.” 4
 
Shepard said, “I used the EMU maintenance kit only as we had described before, to clean the 
seals one time between EVAs. It wasn’t a problem.” 4
 
Mitchell spoke of scratches on helmet visors. “And the helmet and LEVA operations were all 
right, except it certainly is easy to scratch up the helmet and the LEVA. The scratches cause 
shafting light or diffused light problems and that obstructs your vision. All I can say is that you 
have to darn careful with them when you’re using them. Just the slightest touch can cause a 
scratch. My glove problem has been documented already.” 4
 
Scott, in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, said, “Everytime we checked them they were 
configured right.  We did lubricate all the wrist rings, connectors, and helmet rings on this one, 
which was easy. I think that little dab of lubrication material works just fine.” 6
 
Irwin continued, “It was easy and I think it paid off because it was very easy to make the 
connections.” 6
 
Scott added, “We never had a problem with the zipper at all. Both zippers worked very good 
throughout the flight. I don’t remember having your zipper hang up.” 6
 
Irwin said, “We used the lubricant out of the bag. We never used the replacement seals or the 
rings, never had to.” 6
 
Scott said of PLSS PGA operations, “Everything connected and disconnected all right, except 
when we got the dust and dirt. Then, sometimes it would stick, but in general, I thought it worked 
great.” 6
 
Irwin spoke of the protective over gloves, “I’d taken my protective covers off my gloves before I 
even went out on EVA-1 so, of course, they were off for this operation. I was kind of reluctant to 
grasp that drill very hard, afraid I might rip the gloves.” 6
 
Scott agreed, “That’s a good point. I had to leave mine on the whole time because of the drill. 
The protective covers can restrain your hand movements even more that the gloves. I had sort of 
degraded mobility because of those protective covers, all the way. I finally took them off after we 
got through with the drill…When my palms got dirty, I had a difficult time manipulating the 
handle squeeze and the opening and closing because of all the dirt in the tongs. And so, about 
half way through EVA-2, I switched to the other set of tongs that were clean. That helped quite a 
bit. The problem in not having a yo-yo is that I had to stick them in the ground while we were 
gathering the samples.” 6
 
Irwin mentioned visibility problems, “I had some difficulty seeing my flags with the visor down.” 
6
 
Scott answered, “I did too. I found that it was the dust accumulation.” 6
 
 
Young, in the Apollo 16 debrief said, “Every time we took the suit off – it’s real handy that the 
thing is standing up by itself in one-sixth gravity. It’s really handy for you to close the zipper up 
to lube the pressure zipper and get those connectors before you put the thing away for the night. 
On the second and third EVA, because everything was really getting dirty, and I don’t know 
whether it’s a problem or not or an imaginary problem, we were really getting concerned about 
whether we were going to be able to do things like fasten the connectors. So we were taking 
special care to lube everything and, therefore we ran out of lube.” 8
 
Duke said, “We had one left for the zipper on EVA-3.” 8
 
Young added, “We also lubed the zippers during doffing, instead of on donning as we had in our 
checklist, because it was just more convenient to do. The suit was standing up there right in front 
of you and all of the connectors were visible. It would sure help to get the zipper lubed and, also, 
it helped to Charlie to load that bag up.” 8
 
Young continued, “Donning was hard, I’ll tell you, pulling that restraint zipper was really rough. 
After we got the dust in the zipper, closing the zipper and locking it was pretty, pretty bad.” 8
 
Duke replied, “Give me a new restraint zipper.” 8
 
Young said, “Restraint zipper and, also, closing the gloves and locking once we got the dust in 
there was really bad. It didn’t hurt wrist mobility, but it sure was hard to get them closed.” 8
 
Mattingly spoke of problems with his EMU, “I guess this is a good a time as any to talk about 
the only two EMU comments I have. We had two things before I went out. I found it was very 
difficult to move my left wrist. My first thought was that maybe all this stuff about how you lose 
your strength when you lay around like a marshmallow for 10 days was really true and that I had 
just gotten super weak. And so I wasn’t about to complain about it. Now, I look back on it and I’d 
like to have someone look at that glove because I think there’s something wrong with it. At no 
time was I able to comfortably move it. Occasionally I could move it with my wrist, but generally, 
in order to make my left wrist move very much, I had to use my right hand to push the glove over 
to where I wanted it. And then I could keep it there.” 8
 
Duke said, “It sounds like an Ed Mitchell problem to me, like he had on Apollo 14.” 8
 
Young noted, “I ended up on the first EVA leaving a hole in my wrist with a wrist ring. I had 
some wristlets that I had taken up with me, but unfortunately they were in my lower pocket and 
they were all full of dust. So, I borrowed one of Charlie’s and used that on the other two EVAs, 
but it just kept getting worse.” 8
 
Young said, “We said we needed some more lube in there for the surface operation and the 
dust.” 8
 
Young said, “They told us to give a PLSS check, and I couldn’t read my RCU numbers because I 
made a mistake reaching up with my finger and tried to wipe off the dust. Apparently, the dust 
acts like an abrasive as it just completely clobbered the RCU and I couldn’t read what percent 
oxygen I had from then on. I think they ought to do something about that.” 8
 
Duke added, “I dusted mine all the time. It got dusty.” 8
 
Young responded, “I couldn’t read mine.” 8
 
 
Young spoke of doffing the Pressure Garment Assemblies (PGA), “PGA doffing was the usual 
problem of getting the PGAs off. As we said before, we lubricated the zipper when we got the 
PGA off, and then fastened the zipper, and pulled the seals down tight. It was after EVA-1 that we 
noticed the wrist rings were getting clogged with dust. There should be some way to cover those 
wrist rings (the things that snap in and out), the sliders that keep them from getting full of dust 
because it makes them practically impossible to work. After EVA-1, we experienced a little 
stickiness with the helmet. Not a great deal, so we didn’t pay attention to it. When we took the 
suits off they were all dust covered, up to our knees, even though we kicked our boots off as we 
came up the ladder. We took the suits off and put them into a jettison bag, pulled the jettison bag 
up over the legs, and laid them in the couch like everybody else has done.” 8
 
Duke said, “On closeout, the LM was still as dusty and debris covered as ever. We had the same 
problems with the wrist rings as we had on the lunar surface. We managed to get buttoned up all 
right and on time for the jett maneuver.” 8
 
Apollo 16 Mission report described problems with wrist rings. 
“The crew had a continual problem of donning and doffing the gloves because there was dust in 
the wrist ring pull connectors. Even though the connectors were blown out repeatedly and 
appeared to be free of dust, it was extremely hard to pull the wrist ring devices in or out and, in 
fact, rotate the glove on or off. Some type of wrist dirt seal over these connectors is necessary. 9
 
“After exposure to a dusty lunar environment, the both crewmen’s suit wrist-ring disconnects 
were hard to rotate to the locked and unlocked position.” 9
 
Apollo 16 Mission report discussed visibility problems. 
“On the third extravehicular activity, the Commander’s extravehicular mobility unit overvisor 
would not retract; this was due to dust that had accumulated on the helmet as a result of the loss 
of a rear fender from the lunar roving vehicle. 9
 
“Because of the extensive dust coverage, the Commander’s remote control unit was difficult to 
read. An attempt was made on the surface to dust it off with a glove and the abrasive dust 
scratched the remote control unit face. After the remote control unit oxygen gage was scratched, 
it was impossible to read oxygen quantity on the lunar surface and it could read only marginally 
inside the lunar module. A scratch resistant material should be used to cover the remote control 
unit face.” 9
 
Cernan, in the Apollo 17 Technical Debrief said, “Suit doff and don – This will cover all the EV 
prep and post activities. We both found, LMP and CDR that donning and doffing the suit in 1/6g 
was relatively easy. Once again, we had no problems zipping up the suits. In the course of 
doffing, and prior to getting the suit fully off, we mutually lubricated each other’s open zippers 
and all the connectors. When we doffed the suit, we went into a drying mode as the checklist 
suggests prior to the sleep period. I’m really glad we did because our suits stayed relatively fresh 
and clean on the inside. We doffed out LCGs every day and slept in CWGs rather than the LCG. 
And I’m glad we did that because it was much more comfortable. We made it a buddy system in 
the entire donning and prep when it came to the suit operations, except for putting on the gloves. 
We found it easier to put them on in parallel and get them locked and verified locked. We 
actually, each individually in almost all cases put our own dust covers and ring covers on. Maybe 
we had to help each other once in a while. And contrary to some of our initial desires, we decided 
to go ahead and put those dust covers on for every EVA. After the first EVA, we found out what 
the dust problem really was.” 11
 
 
Schmitt added, “One of the tabs on the LMP’s dust covers did break off on the first prep.” 11
 
Cernan said, “We obviously took extreme care of our suits – the best we could – because we had 
to use them several times. I think that care paid off because even at the integrity check of the 
CM/EVA, the suits were tighter than a drum. I think the wrist connectors, even with the dust 
covers, were tending to get a little bit stiff.” 11
 
Schmitt added, “Yes, mine were very stiff.” 11
 
Cernan said, “But nothing ever really froze up on us.” 11
 
Schmitt remarked, “LEVA operation – I did have the sticky visor problem and it was dust. We 
could force it closed, once we got it off. We tried once on the surface, and we couldn’t get it 
closed.” 11
 
Cernan said, “Connectors and controls were good on the PLSS throughout the flight. They are 
the one thing that did not seem to get affected by the dust. They may have gotten a little stiffer, but 
I could not tell it.” 11
 
Cernan noted, “Helmet visor reflections – I had not particular problems with the helmet. My gold 
visor got very dirty and dusty and scratched up very early in the first EVA, and I cleaned it as the 
ground prescribed before each EVA, but it really didn’t do much good. I just learned to live with 
it, and it really didn’t degrade the operations much at all.” 11
 
Apollo 17 Mission report discussed degraded sun shade operation, “The Lunar Module Pilot 
encountered some difficulty in operating the sun shade of the lunar extravehicular visor assembly 
because of lunar dust in the slide mechanism. Dust and scratches on the outer gold visor 
prompted the crew to operate with the outer visor in the partially raised position during part of 
the third extravehicular activity.” 10
 
The report described donning and doffing operations, “Suit donning and doffing was 
accomplished essentially as planned. Particular care was exercised in the cleaning and 
lubrication of zippers and other dust sensitive portions of the extravehicular mobility unit. The 
dust protectors on the wrist lock-locks were used on each extravehicular activity, but it is difficult 
to determine how much protection these provided. The conservative approach was to use them; 
however, the moving parts of the extravehicular mobility unit seemed to be usable for an 
indefinite number of extravehicular activities providing that proper care was given to them.” 10
 
The report described closeout on the second EVA, “The closeout time for this extravehicular 
activity was also lengthened to account for additional effort required in dusting the 
extravehicular mobility units.” 10
 
Apollo 17 Mission report, “One of the two sets of spacers, which were subject to galling from 
dust, were removed from the lunar extravehicular visor assembly.”10
 
Recommendations 
Apollo 12 Mission report observed, “Some type of throwaway overgarment for use on the lunar 
surface may be necessary.” 2
 
 
The Apollo 14 Mission report says, “It should be noted that the wrist-ring and neck-ring seals on 
both pressure garment assemblies were lubricated between extravehicular activities. At that time, 
there was very little evidence of grip or dirt on the seals. Lubricating the seals between 
extravehicular activities is a procedure that should be continued on subsequent missions.” 5
 
In the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief, Scott said, “Yes, that’s true. I might comment that lunar dust 
is very soluble in water. It seems to wash off very easily. I would say if you ever have a connector 
problem that was really stiff, you could take the water gun and spray it in and loosen it up.” 6
 
Scott noted, “We tried to brush them off and clean them off. We found that the booties which had 
been placed over the PLSS connectors were good protection from the dirt.” 6  
 
Irwin added, “We did not loosen the suit connections for EVA-2 but we did for EVA-3.” 6 
 
Scott recommended, “put booties over all the connectors or some sort of protective device. In the 
old days, they had a bib to keep them clean – or for double protection, I guess. Something like 
that would sure prevent problems later on and would save time cleaning the connectors. They 
sure get dirty. If you are going to go out there and do the job, you are going to get dirty. If you try 
to keep everything clean, you are just not going to be able to do the job on time. I think those little 
booties are a pretty good idea. They were no problem on the donning and doffing.” 6
 
Apollo 15 Mission report said, “Neck ring dust covers were provided to keep lunar dust out of the 
pressure garment assemblies when not being worn.” 7
 
In the Apollo 16 Mission Technical Debrief, Young said, “I think you should have some more 
lube in case you do get to a situation where as you’re doing your last donning, something is not 
working right and you need to go back and lube it again to make sure…Yes. That’s been 
remarked on before. Somebody said they taped their wrist ring but that seems like to be a kluge. I 
think they should come up with something that keeps the dust our of the wrist ring.” 8
 
Apollo 16 Mission report described EMU improvements. “The extravehicular mobility unit was 
modified to improve its operational capability, safety, and to provide increased dust 
protection…Dust protections were added to the oxygen purge system gas connectors and portable 
life support system water connectors…Velcro was added to the battery covers to provide 
increased protection against dust. Reflective tape was added to provide more radiative 
cooling…New underseat stowage bags with dust covers were provided…The thumper selector 
switch was modified to provide a more positive detent and all openings around the thumper 
selector knob and arming  firing knob were covered with dust protectors.” 9
 
The report described improved wrist disconnects. “Postflight inspection of the wrist disconnects 
showed that lunar dust in the clearance areas cause the problem. Rubber dust covers for the ring 
disconnects which will afford better protection from contamination will be added for 
Apollo 17.” 9
 
Duke said, “We started a little bit early on the helmets and gloves because of a wrist ring 
problem.” 8
 
Young agreed, “I’m glad we did, because we had a problem. Every time we put the wrist rings on 
we didn’t know if we were going to get them on, and then once we got them on we didn’t know if 
we could get them off again. We knew we were going to get ‘em off, but it sure wasn’t the normal 
 
click click, push pull. I think we need some protection against dirt getting into those wrist 
locks.” 8
 
Mattingly suggested, “If you’d wrap a piece of tape around—”  8
 
Young responded, “I thought about wrapping tape around it but would the tape stick?” 8
 
Mattingly added, “That gray tape would do it.” 8
 
Young answered, “I’m not sure it would stick in a vacuum very long. I think you need something 
more than tokenism on that cover.” 8
 
Analysis 
Many of the Apollo crews expressed problems with wrist locks and mobility due to dust on 
surfaces. Dust that was allowed to accumulate on these surfaces may have infiltrated during 
EVAs or while in the LM. Also, CM pilots on Apollo 14 and 15 experienced wrist mobility 
problems as well. The training suits allowed more mobility, however, they were used for many 
more hours. More investigation is needed to determine the mechanism for dust contamination; if 
mobility problems were caused by engineering design; and if a break-in period, associated with 
the training suits, allowed for better mobility. Zippers were difficult to operate during Apollo 16. 
Dust mitigation techniques were implemented with varying degrees. Lubrication and dust covers 
appeared to improve the situation in some cases, but was not as effective in others. More 
investigation is needed to determine the cause of these problems and evaluate the effectiveness of 
dust management techniques. 
 
The Apollo 12 crew reported that after a couple of more EVAs mechanisms would have ground 
to a halt, while the Apollo 17 Mission report suggested that the EMU would function for an 
indefinite number of EVAs, however the crew mentioned stiffness in wrist connectors. 
 
Scratches and dust accumulation reduced visibility for some Apollo crews. This problem was not 
corrected during the Apollo Program. 
 
The Apollo 11 crew reported increased suit pressure losses, while the Apollo 12 crew noted 
reduced suit pressure losses. The problem appears to have been corrected after Apollo 11. 
 
Future Work 
NASA should perform comparative analysis on flight and training suits to determine the root 
cause of mobility and locking problems. 
 
Members of the team assigned to develop the Lunar Surface Suit should participate in the Lunar 
Dust Working Group and abrasion, mechanisms, and seals should be included as topics in the 







This section is included to provide information for consideration in technology portfolio and 
operations design, lunar stimulant selection and LREP missions.  
 
Regolith refers to the material formed by physically weather, by some form of either abrasion or 
stress, bedrock to produce a bed of finer grained rock fragments that have not been chemically 
altered. The fine fragmental material we are concerned with is regolith. Dust refers to a particular 
size fraction, not the material in aggregate. However, many NASA documents refer to the 
regolith as dust, so this report uses dust and regolith interchangeably. 
 
During Apollo 14, the crew experienced dust that appeared to differ from other sites. Although 
the report described the dust as clinging to surfaces, the crew mentioned, that the dust did not 
adhere to equipment. There were also many references, in the Mission report and Technical 
Debrief, to the non-cohesive nature of the dust.  
 
Some Apollo crewmembers reported odors they described as gun powder smell and attributed 
these to the lunar dust. This may indicate that the dust may be reactive. There is no evidence of 
this to date. However, because the containers containing lunar samples lost vacuum, there is no 
way to determine if the dust reacted with the humidity in the atmosphere of the spacecrafts. 
Therefore, it is not possible to conclusively answer this question. If data is gathered that indicates 
that the dust is reactive then reactivity should also be considered in hardware design to ensure 
system integrity and reliability. 
  
If dust properties vary from site to site, mission, operations, and hardware designers must 
consider these differences in their designs and lunar simulants used for systems testing must be 
appropriate. Recommendations for lunar dust characterization should be made to the LREP 
Project to ensure the knowledge base contains enough information to properly design reliable 




The Apollo 11 Mission report described the characteristics of the dust Tranquility Base. “The 
bulk of the surface layer consists of fine-grained particles which tended to adhere to the 
crewmen’s boots and suits, as well as equipment, and was molded into smooth forms in the 
footprints.1
 
“The regolith is weak and relatively easily trenched to depths of several centimeters. At an 
altitude of approximately 30 meters prior to landing, the crewmen observed dust moving away 
from the center of the descent propulsion blast. The lunar module foot pads penetrated to a 
maximum depth of 7 or 8 centimeters. The crewmen’s boots left prints generally from 3 
millimeters to 2 or 3 centimeters deep. Surface material was easily dislodged by being kicked. 
The flagpole and drive tubes were pressed into the surface to a depth of approximately 12 
centimeters. At that depth, the regolith was not sufficiently strong to hold the core tubes upright. 
A hammer as used to drive them to depths of 15 to 20 centimeters. At places, during scooping 
operations, rocks were encountered in the subsurface. 1
 
 
“The crewmen’s boot treads were sharply preserved and angles as large as 70 degrees were 
maintained in the print walls. The surface disturbed by walking tended to break into slabs, 
cracking outward about 12 to 15 centimeters from the edge of footprints.” 1
 
Bean described the soil in the Apollo 12 Technical Debrief, “The core tube was pretty easy to 
drive. I think we must have been in a different sort of soil that Buzz was in; I augered it a bit as I 
drove it in, but I really never had the feeling that that was necessary. I think all that was 
necessary was to hit it pretty doggoned hard and drive it in there. We had no trouble going the 
full length.” 3
 
Shepard in the Apollo 14 Technical Debrief said of sampling, “I did what I was supposed to do 
and put it in the bag. I was surprised that there was little adherence of the surface dust. I 
expected a little bit more. It didn’t adhere very much.” 4
 
The Apollo 14 Mission report said, “The lunar module footpad penetration on landing appears to 
have been greater than that observed on previous Apollo landings. Bootprint penetrations for the 
crew ranged from ½ to ¾ inch on level ground in the vicinity of the lunar module to 4 inches on 
the rim of small craters. Lunar soil adhered extensively to the crewmen’s clothing and equipment 
as in earlier Apollo missions. Tracks from the modular equipment transporter were ¼ to ¾ inch 
deep and were smooth.” 5
 
The report continued, “Footprints on the lunar surface were not more than ½ to ¾ inch deep 
except in the rims of craters, where, at times, they were ¾ inch to 1 ½ inches deep. The modular 
equipment transporter tracks were seldom more than ½ inch deep.” 5
 
The report stated, “Dust on the lunar surface seemed to be less of a problem than had been 
anticipated. The dust clings to soft, porous materials and is easily removed from metals. The 
pressure garments were impregnated with dust; however, most of the surface dust could be 
removed. The little dust that accumulated on the modular equipment transporter could easily be 
removed by brushing. The lunar map collected dust and required brushing or rubbing with a 
glove to make the map usable.” 5
 
Apollo 15 Mission report commented on the Rover’s performance. “The surface material varied 
from a thin powdered dust which the boots would penetrate to a depth of 5 to 8 centimeters (2 to 
3 inches) on the slope of the Apennine Front to a firm rille soil which was penetrated about 1 
centimeter (one-quarter to one-half inch) by the boot. In all cases, the rover's performance was 
changed very little.”7
 
Young said in the Apollo 16 Technical Debrief, “That moon is really looking at a geology field 
trip through 6 feet of dirt and its kind of tough.” 8
 
Apollo 16 Mission report said, “Lunar dust and soil continues to cause problems with some 
equipment although procedural measures have been taken and equipment changes and addition 
have been made to control the condition.” 9
 
The Apollo 17 Mission report described lunar dust, “Surface texture, dust generation, 
cohesiveness, and average footprint depth indicates soil properties at the surface comparable to 
those at other Apollo landing sites.” 10
 
Scott, in the Apollo 15 Technical Debrief said, “When you took your helmet off, you could smell 
the lunar dirt. It smelled like – the nearest analogy I can think of is gunpowder.” 6
 
 
Evans, in the Apollo 17 Technical Debrief, said, “Odors – Every time I got up in the tunnel after 
docking or anytime, there was always a musty burned odor or something. It’s hard to 
describe.” 11
 
Schmitt adds, “Like a powder burn.” 11
 
Evans said, “Kind of like a powder burn. I guess. This was there both in lunar orbit docking and 
transearth docking. This was the second day we were out when we finally went up in the tunnel. 




Lunar dust characteristics may be different from site to site. Different lunar landing sites may 
require different dust management techniques and technologies. 
 
Future Work 
Proposed landing sites should be evaluated to determine lunar dust properties and appropriate 
engineering and operational solutions should be designed to ensure effective dust management. 
Lunar dust simulants should be evaluated to ensure relevant characteristics of the dust are 





This section is included for use by toxicologists and physicians who will establish standards for 
human inhalation. These standards will become mission and hardware design constraints and will 




Young said, “Dust, Density and Effects on Visual and Respiratory Systems.” 8
 
Duke responded, “It was dusty when we got back in orbit, we’ve already commented on all that 
stuff.” 8
 
Young said, “I don’t think it was any problem.” 8
 
Duke responded, “I got one piece in my eye – a little something when I was over in the LM that 
gave me problems, but it was okay; it cleared right up, watered it out.” 8
 
Cernan said, in the Apollo 17 debrief, “In sputum – I didn’t spit anything up. I didn’t feel any 
aerosol problems at all until after rendezvous and docking when I took off my helmet in zero-g 
and we had the lunar module cabin running the whole time. I did all the transfer with my helmet 
and gloves off, and I’m sorry I did because the dust really began to bother me. It bothered my 
eyes, it bothered by throat, and I was tasting it and eating it and I really could feel it working 
back and forth between the tunnel and the LM. Ron, did you feel any effects of the dust when we 
docked and rendezvoused, particularly?” 11
 
Evans answers, “Only when I stuck my head in the LM. When I climbed up in the tunnel I could 
definitely tell there was a lot of dust up in the LM and you could smell it. It’s a difference, so I 
think you noticed it from that standpoint, but there never really was dust in the command module. 
The only time you ever got any dirt in the command module was when you touched something 
that had dirt on it. But as far as floating around in the command module – I don’t think it ever 
did.” 11
 
Schmitt said, “Eye irritation during photos – I did not notice any. Helmet visor reflections I guess 
have been very well covered. With the dust and scratches on the helmet, of course, you needed to 
shade the helmet more and more in order to see with the Sun directly on the helmet.” 11
 
Schmitt added, “Dust – We’ll just talk about in-cabin dust. After the first EVA, there was 
considerable dust in the cabin. It would be stirred up by movements of the suit and the gear that 
we had. Almost immediately upon removing my helmet, I started to pick up the symptoms that you 
might associate with hay fever symptoms. I never had runny eyes or runny nose. It was merely a 
stuffiness in the nose and maybe in the frontal sinuses that affected my speech and my respiration 
considerably. After about 2 hours within the cabin, those symptoms gradually disappeared. By 
morning of the next day, they were gone completely. After the second and third EVAs, although 
I’m sure the dust was comparable, the symptoms were not nearly as strong as after the first EVA. 
That was as if I either developed a mucous protection of the affected areas or had some way or 




The Lunar Dust Working Group should include toxicologists and physicians to ensure human 






This section is included as information to provide insight into personal cleaning for technology 




Conrad speaks of cleaning, “The potable water was used for personal hygiene, and I’d also like 
to have some soap along for personal hygiene and just to get clean after lunar surface operation 
– just to get the dirt off. That’s another reason we wanted more towels. We all stripped down all 
the way and washed down with the water and our towels several times during the flight.”2
 
Young explained, “Potable water Used for personal hygiene. We’d get the towels and wipe up. 
But that sure is not the way to get clean. All that does is smear the dirt around.” 8
 
Cernan, during the Apollo 17 Technical Debrief said, “If Jack and I had one request, it would be 
to carry one more CWG for cleanliness. Particularly when you come back from the LM as dirty 
as you are, we could have used one more CWG throughout the entire flight.” 11
 
Cernan said, “After rendezvous and docking – After the CDR and LMP had been living with this 
dust for 3 days on the lunar surface, there was a compelling urge on both of our parts to get 
clean. We spent about 2 or 3 hours prior to going to bed doing nothing by effectively taking soap 
and water and trying to wash as much of our body as we could to get free from what is really sort 
of a dirty feeling due to the dust. Even with soap and water it was sometimes very difficult to get 





Lunar dust will present significant challenges to NASA’s Lunar Exploration Missions. The 
challenges can be overcome by using best practices in system engineering design. 
 
For successful lunar surface missions, all systems that come into contact with lunar dust must 
consider the effects throughout the entire design process. Interfaces between all these systems 
with other systems also must be considered. 
 
Incorporating dust management into Concept of Operations and Requirements development are 
the best place to begin to mitigate the risks presented by lunar dust. However, that is only the 
beginning. To be successful, every person who works on NASA’s Constellation lunar missions 
must be mindful of this problem. 
 
Success will also require fiscal responsibility. NASA must learn from Apollo the root cause of 
problems caused by dust, and then find the most cost-effective solutions to address each 
challenge. This will require a combination of common sense existing technologies and promising, 
innovative technical solutions. 
 
“Dust – I think probably the most aggravating, restricting facets of lunar surface 
explorations is the dust and its adherence to everything no matter what kind of 
material, whether it be skin, suit material, metal, no matter what it be and it’s 
restrictive friction-like action to everything it gets on. For instance, the simple 
large tolerance mechanical devices on the Rover began to show the effects of 
dust as the EVAs went on. By the middle or end of the third EVA , simple things 
like bag locks and the lock which held the pallet on the Rover began not only to 
malfunction but to not function al all. They effectively froze. We tried to dust 
them and bang the dust off and clean them, and there was just no way. The effect 
of dust on mirrors, camera, and checklists is phenomenal. You have to live with it 
but you’re continually fighting the dust problem both outside and inside the 
spacecraft. Once you get inside the spacecraft, as much as you dust yourself, you 
start taking off the suits and you have dust on your hands and your face and 
you’re walking in it. You can be as careful in cleaning up as you want to, but it 
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